Update RedGuard Version 22.7.14

CHANGELOG

@@ -1,10 +1,15 @@
-## [22.7.4.11.30] - 2022-7-4
+## [22.7.14.1043] - 2022-7-14
 ### Added
-- Fix inconsistent request IP address and interception IP address Domain fronting
+- Resolve the problem that the custom certificate is overwritten
 
-## [22.6.30.1107] - 2022-6-30
+## [22.7.12.1111] - 2022-7-12
 ### Added
-- Domain fronting Obtain the actual requested IP address
+- Profile Header authentication ignores case
+- Disable the default JARM fingerprint randomization parameter
+- Change the long version name!!
+- Forward the packet XFF header so that C2 gets the real IP address
+- Custom configuration file path
+- Added validity verification for parameter IP input
 
 ## [22.6.28.1712] - 2022-6-28
 ### Added
@@ -19,4 +24,4 @@ due to the incompatibility of TLS jarm fingerprint randomize with custom certifi
 
 ## [22.5.20.1220] - 2022-5-20
 ### Added
-- Initialize project
+- Initialize project

README.md

@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ As shown in the figure above, in the case of unauthorized access, the response i
 
 In the above basic interception case, the default interception method is used, that is, the illegal traffic is intercepted by redirection. By modifying the configuration file, we can change the interception method and the redirected site URL. In fact, this The other way is a redirect, which might be more aptly described as hijacking, cloning, since the response status code returned is 200, and the response is taken from another website to mimic the cloned/hijacked website as closely as possible.
 
-Invalid packets can be misrouted according to two strategies:
+Invalid packets can be misrouted according to three strategies:
 
 - **reset**: Terminate the TCP connection immediately.
 - **proxy**: Get a response from another website to mimic the cloned/hijacked website as closely as possible.
@@ -196,6 +196,17 @@ The blue team tracing behavior is analyzed through the interception log of the t
 
 ![image.png](https://github.com/wikiZ/RedGuardImage/raw/main/1656310909975.jpg)
 
+
+## RedGuard Obtain the real IP address
+
+This section describes how to configure RG to obtain the real IP address of a request. You only need to add the following configuration to the profile of the C2 device, that is, to obtain the real IP address of the target through the request header X-Forwarded-For.
+
+```bash
+http-config {
+    set trust_x_forwarded_for "true";
+}
+```
+
 ## Request geographic restrictions
 
 The configuration method takes AllowLocation = Jinan, Beijing as an example. It is worth noting here that RedGuard provides two APIs for IP attribution anti-check, one for domestic users and the other for overseas users. Dynamically assign which API to use. If the target is in China, enter Chinese for the set region. Otherwise, enter English place names. It is recommended that domestic users use Chinese names. In this way, the accuracy of the attribution found and the response speed of the API are both is the best choice.

RedGuard.go

@@ -84,12 +84,16 @@ func main() {
 	)
 	core.CmdParse(&parse, &cert, &_proxy)
 	// Check whether RedGuard has been initialized
-	if num, isExits := lib.CreateConfig(parse.C2Type /* C2 Facility Type */); isExits {
+	if num, isExits := lib.CreateConfig(parse.C2Type /* C2 Facility Type */, parse.ConfigPath); isExits {
 		switch {
 		case parse.Update:
 			lib.UpdateConfig(&cert, &_proxy) // Update RedGuard Config
 			logger.Notice("RedGuard Configuration file updated successfully!")
 		case parse.IP != "":
+			if lib.CheckIP(parse.IP) == false {
+				logger.Warning("Please enter a valid IP address")
+				os.Exit(0)
+			}
 			logger.Noticef("Search ipLookUpHelper: %s", parse.IP)
 			core.IPLookUp(parse.Location /* owning place to be verified */, parse.IP) // Query the location of an IP address
 		case num == 0:

cert-rsa/ca.crt

@@ -1,24 +1,24 @@
 -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
-MIIEFTCCAv2gAwIBAgIIFv6CRztNa1AwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwZjELMAkGA1UE
+MIIEFDCCAvygAwIBAgIIFwGR46UNXCwwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwZjELMAkGA1UE
 BhMCQ04xETAPBgNVBAcTCEhhbmdaaG91MS0wKwYDVQQKEyRBbGliYWJhIChDaGlu
 YSkgVGVjaG5vbG9neSBDby4sIEx0ZC4xFTATBgNVBAMMDCouYWxpeXVuLmNvbTAe
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-a5eLziaD5VOy6RNFxd517CzAJoKtKauL5jNzmrEe0jaDRVRQbhwJPw4=
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+LmNvbTANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAHPsbex1ZR9p/5p/EdJrvlM3IhMIXUo2D
+tm/NWbEB4IVBa+mX0YGs60DiH8R+4VFWKvVhIzcf2/iZuiDKO8jeeZ3mSyDqdPD+
+T40gcNQhvPAH6YMPg8LzYAXVAZcxYCw0PmHr/Sl7EJH8LlR84Nz26HjPqNdLmIZA
+ui0jz4zSGtrcqFZzA2+DKiHsnKeQ4685FBUHJP51gyimYiPpQQW3uKPE1uC+8Aq/
+omArVJf9wnBLUWa1vZ4B12G4NVQXHcLvg13tOR0YHnRBJ5OR8ibYBy5VChbqktc4
+9hgOKhm4RO/6XIg6Dey/mBefannq2DgTj2lv9NNXiFppj81ugWhOmQ==
 -----END CERTIFICATE-----

cert-rsa/ca.key

@@ -1,27 +1,27 @@
 -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
-MIIEowIBAAKCAQEAzpW24GpGu38AYnrIEHBJvHa6Fyy+RR17I5FxGLRODyWPKcT5
-gA32HeOwiie7h8BBz2oCThpmIWHk65cvndmcxUoxD+TrJKqKvY1h73YoGviGHLAT
-RBAhscbEMSLl4hYtCSgtK4KLTzhtg7bbu4ffGkcmuXt/C/ZH91/lynZM+BlXidcb
-0uqq/YX5GlLkHx4hCqfYgdgOf0i2eEcRIGqdp9xydILd+Sgr/f1rfJIZYzBOYde1
-CfZ+2HFX71eBnONXgyS+12pZFAHbSc72TsvfR9qtVWU7Jm7ME8EBQ4YwdIPxHmsZ
-p4CoBQ6fi8yahNlNlrjINh8nz3LwswVa51lrnwIDAQABAoIBAQCGj35PLupjtpXJ
-j7BBBOMCn1MXRU2qN0m+IT5JmSg/NXfK/UKG5pEpZuXXF4pPIiu7rpFRzmA33kv+
-KLwbVWOIHotWjwWbHHrCfRUNpSj6aGbyyL3D174azh184/5ZBZjQHhtN+/pB3791
-y+XUgOwRcccHiil24TR/LTfAaM45yxxh/xx/0suExYTaBtadpdsPbg7x8wBk1slg
-rEXOKKhcwq7fapnssJccF6//vSyBr4yOGOZmKUPpj9MSNZMD/htwGBm+dJejXKKa
-jwNL0CjEVYMtIzUbSXM8nrWu8Zrw2X5+HwL5PlVcJvj5X0teNSG7hLWnZiHJbvFP
-EdbOcKgBAoGBAOdN1Ymoofyz/Sl4FQNHc1KhwRBPqqbiJ11lbsH2lywdKzZnBscl
-OHnp5NiySY8uV9WOXd2+EyOhP6obd9DhrsrfMaIt7m+jHSmxQi7PYIZIEr6nWjmA
-CZLwAgfHRXN7Urlc0bet48wX4yrw8lz9gcjNxqGpsASotg6a/jJZ1V8vAoGBAOSk
-PK+5i2U47bHkL8T9TTNqYc1gm0F5TA6qgt+CNPzU5JhYju+KLp4LXx8fmgaRLNMI
-/AVb6gM17J0eqh4nuGQQQh4P3/QLQSfckfk7Xl3doePq1ppqJWyIlHQ42dF+Dyil
-Z3spMnToM8XHOow5bQMmXVJsBxH6f+OkGVqjWR6RAoGAKpQJWu3P49S+JYQVWiUs
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+P2kxHaMRO6FX0GqzSt6rH1y1ngEpDxKZ9Sdw04anaGm3j+iGU2O0woTZqOSVZKYb
+TQI8sGaEmzFwkZTArPm8zNWDiqnJUIOfmcBSYSDt1XktpgcSBqK6GpXbplUt4N3u
+gNJRAoGBAIo2SQXHObtfphpMVoDZm3A2DubekPuY5aHx0x5U24IDcF/19AJ3SvOh
+U7NHpHgGDal5WhLN9dIRBxujP/BL1TAKPpf6P5x4o1Jva0tUWcLvTzAM6NgFMY+0
+p4z+rF2IIkG383nWDpSL3r+0mpUEaPY5iCO8fyUQQtIr6gt+o8PW
 -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----

config/RedGuard_CobaltStrike.go

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ Organization = Alibaba (China) Technology Co., Ltd.
 # Cert User Country
 Country      = CN
 # Whether to use the certificate you have applied for true/false
-HasCert      = false
+HasCert      = true
 
 [proxy]
 # key   : Header Host value of the reverse proxy

config/version.go

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ Github:%s
 
 RedGuard is a C2 front flow control tool,Can avoid Blue Teams,AVs,EDRs check.
 `
-	VERSION   = "22.7.4.11.30 Alpha"
+	VERSION   = "22.7.14 Alpha"
 	TITLE     = "RedGuard"
 	LICENSE   = "GPL-2.0"
 	URL       = "https://github.com/wikiZ/RedGuard"

core/ProxyFilter.go

@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ func MalleableFilter(file string, req *http.Request) (isFilter bool) {
 			var num int // Exception counter
 			// Traverse the target profile requirements header slice
 			for _, profileHeader := range malleable.headerParam {
-				if reqHeader != profileHeader {
+				if strings.ToLower(reqHeader) != strings.ToLower(profileHeader) {
 					continue
 				}
 				num += 1 // The same header exists
@@ -132,7 +132,6 @@ func ProxyFilterManger(req *http.Request) (status bool) {
 			}
 		}
 	}
-
 	// Check the location of the requested IP address
 	if allowLocation != "" && allowLocation != "*" {
 		// @param	allowLocation	string  The territory that is allowed to go online

core/ProxyHandler.go

@@ -84,6 +84,8 @@ func (h *baseHandle) ServeHTTP(write http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
 	if req.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For") != "" {
 		req.RemoteAddr = req.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For")
 	}
+	// Set the forwarding header XFF so that C2 obtains the online real IP address
+	req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", req.RemoteAddr)
 	// Check whether the host is verified
 	if IPHash := lib.EncodeMD5(req.JA3); arrays.ContainsString(_addressArray, req.JA3) == -1 {
 		logger.Noticef("JA3 FingerPrint: %s", IPHash)

core/arguments.go

@@ -17,11 +17,12 @@ func CmdParse(parse *parameter.Parses, cert *parameter.Cert, proxy *parameter.Pr
 	flag.BoolVar(&parse.Update, "u", false, `Enable configuration file modification`)
 	flag.StringVar(&parse.C2Type, "type", `CobaltStrike`, `C2 Server Type`)
 	flag.StringVar(&parse.IP, "ip", ``, `IPLookUP IP`)
+	flag.StringVar(&parse.ConfigPath, "config", ``, `Set Config Path`)
 	flag.StringVar(&parse.Location, "location", `风起`, `IPLookUP Location`)
 	flag.StringVar(&cert.Country, "country", `CN`, `Cert Country`)
 	flag.StringVar(&cert.CommonName, "common", `*.aliyun.com`, `Cert CommonName`)
 	flag.StringVar(&cert.Organization, "organization", `Alibaba (China) Technology Co., Ltd.`, `Cert Organization`)
-	flag.StringVar(&cert.HasCert, "HasCert", `false`, `Whether to use the certificate you have applied for`)
+	flag.StringVar(&cert.HasCert, "HasCert", `true`, `Whether to use the certificate you have applied for`)
 	flag.StringVar(&cert.DNSNameTo, "dns", `*.aliyun.com,manager.channel.aliyun.com,*.acs-internal.aliyuncs.com",*.connect.aliyun.com,aliyun.com,whois.www.net.cn,tianchi-global.com`, `Cert DNSName`)
 	flag.StringVar(&cert.Locality, "locality", `HangZhou`, `Cert Locality`)
 	flag.StringVar(&proxy.HostTarget, "host", `{"360.net":"http://127.0.0.1:8080","360.com":"https://127.0.0.1:4433"}`, `Set Proxy HostTarget`)

core/parameter/options.go

@@ -8,10 +8,11 @@
 package parameter
 
 type Parses struct {
-	Update   bool
-	C2Type   string
-	IP       string
-	Location string
+	Update     bool
+	IP         string
+	C2Type     string
+	Location   string
+	ConfigPath string
 }
 
 type Cert struct {

doc/README_CN.md

@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ Usage of ./RedGuard:
 
 上述的基础拦截案例中，使用的是默认的拦截方式，也就是将非法流量以重定向的方式拦截，而通过配置文件的修改，我们可以更改拦截的方式，以及重定向的站点URL，其实这种方式与之说是重定向，描述为劫持、克隆或许更贴切，因为返回的响应状态码为200，是从另一个网站获取响应，以尽可能接近地模仿克隆/劫持的网站。
 
-无效数据包可能会根据两种策略被错误路由：
+无效数据包可能会根据三种策略被错误路由：
 
 - **reset**：立即终止 TCP 连接。
 - **proxy**：从另一个网站获取响应，以尽可能接近地模仿克隆/劫持的网站。
@@ -194,6 +194,16 @@ Port_HTTP = :80
 
 ![image.png](https://github.com/wikiZ/RedGuardImage/raw/main/1656310909975.jpg)
 
+## RedGuard获取真实IP地址
+
+针对于日常、域前置场景下获取真实请求IP，RG无需进行任何配置，仅需对启动C2设施的profile文件增加以下配置，即通过请求头X-Forwarded-For获取目标真实IP。
+
+```bash
+http-config {
+    set trust_x_forwarded_for "true";
+}
+```
+
 ## 请求地域限制
 
 配置方式以AllowLocation = 济南,北京 为例，这里值得注意的是，RedGuard提供了两个IP归属地反查的API，一个适用于国内用户，另一个适用于海外用户，并且可以根据输入的地域名动态的分配使用哪个API，如果目标是中国的那么设置的地域就输入中文，反之输入英文地名，建议国内的用户使用中文名即可，这样反查到的归属地准确度以及API的响应速度都是最好的选择。

lib/CreateSSL.go

@@ -89,6 +89,12 @@ func GenerateSelfSignedCert(cert *parameter.Cert) {
 }
 
 func InitGenerateSelfSignedCert() {
+	// Check whether an SSL certificate is generated
+	if _existsCrt, _ := FileExists("cert-rsa/ca.crt"); _existsCrt {
+		if _existsKey, _ := FileExists("cert-rsa/ca.key"); _existsKey {
+			return
+		}
+	}
 	// Example Create a CA certificate storage directory
 	if _, err := os.Stat("cert-rsa"); err != nil {
 		_ = os.Mkdir("cert-rsa", 0766) // Directory permissions

lib/convert.go

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import (
 	"crypto/md5"
 	"encoding/hex"
 	"encoding/json"
+	"os"
 	"regexp"
 )
 
@@ -37,3 +38,22 @@ func EncodeMD5(s string) string {
 	md5Str := hex.EncodeToString(hash.Sum(nil))
 	return md5Str
 }
+
+// CheckIP Check whether the entered IP address is valid
+func CheckIP(ip string) bool {
+	if m, _ := regexp.MatchString("^(25[0-5]|2[0-4]\\d|[0-1]\\d{2}|[1-9]?\\d)\\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4]\\d|[0-1]\\d{2}|[1-9]?\\d)\\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4]\\d|[0-1]\\d{2}|[1-9]?\\d)\\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4]\\d|[0-1]\\d{2}|[1-9]?\\d)$", ip); !m {
+		return false
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+func FileExists(path string) (bool, error) {
+	_, err := os.Stat(path)
+	if err == nil {
+		return true, nil
+	}
+	if os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		return false, nil
+	}
+	return false, err
+}

lib/handle_config.go

@@ -8,13 +8,13 @@
 package lib
 
 import (
+	"RedGuard/config"
 	"RedGuard/core/parameter"
 	"fmt"
+	"io/ioutil"
 	"os"
 	"os/user"
 
-	"RedGuard/config"
-
 	"github.com/go-ini/ini"
 )
 
@@ -30,17 +30,19 @@ func InitConfig() *ini.File {
 	// Check whether loading failed
 	if err != nil {
 		logger.Errorf("Fail to read file: %v", err)
-		goto LOOK
+		os.Exit(0)
 	}
 	// return *ini.File object
 	return cfg
-LOOK:
-	return nil
 }
 
-func CreateConfig(C2Server string) (int, bool) {
+func CreateConfig(C2Server string, ConfigPath string) (int, bool) {
 	currentUser, _ := user.Current() // Current operating system user directory
 	_ConfigFilename = fmt.Sprintf("%s/.RedGuard_%s.ini", currentUser.HomeDir, C2Server)
+	// Verify that the configuration file is customized
+	if file, _ := ioutil.ReadFile(ConfigPath); len(file) != 0 {
+		_ConfigFilename = ConfigPath // Configuration file using a custom path
+	}
 	// Check whether the current operating system user directory configuration file exists
 	if _, err := os.Stat(_ConfigFilename); err == nil || os.IsExist(err) {
 		return 0, true