add length check to detect array modification during sort. when realloc()
shrinks an array in-place, it may return the same pointer, defeating the
pointer-only check. the new check catches both pointer changes and length
changes, preventing out-of-bounds access.
the fix captures array pointer and length at the start of each comparison,
then validates both after user code executes. this detects modifications
even when realloc() returns the original pointer.
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
refactor to use the standard Data_Make_Struct() macro instead of manual
RData allocation and linking. the macro provides automatic zero-initialization
and is more idiomatic.
ref #6655
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
remove redundant visualcpp and mingw checks since for_windows? already
detects all windows builds including visual c++ and mingw.
ref #6653
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
removed due to same OIDC authentication failures as claude-code-review.
workflow can be re-added when the action is more stable.
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
removed due to persistent OIDC authentication failures in the beta action.
workflow can be re-added when the action is more stable.
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
refactored the stack-use-after-return fix to encapsulate pool memory
handling in mpz_move instead of bint_set, providing cleaner code and
automatic protection for all 22 callers of mpz_move; ref #6651
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
If memory allocated with `mrb_malloc()` is not associated with an object, subsequent attempts to allocate memory or objects will fail and raise an exception, resulting in a memory leak.
both hash and linear paths cache array lengths before loops that call
mrb_eql() and mrb_equal(), which can execute user code that modifies
arrays, causing out-of-bounds access.
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
khash operations (kh_get, kh_put) call mrb_eql() which can execute user
code that modifies arrays during iteration, invalidating cached pointers
and lengths. reverted hoisting in ary_subtract_internal, ary_union_internal,
ary_intersection_internal, and ary_uniq_bang hash paths.
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
this reverts commit 04af58db89 which caused use-after-free vulnerability.
cached array pointers become invalid when mrb_cmp() executes user's <=>
method that can modify arrays during iteration
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The fix is to modify `bint_set` to ensure that the data stored in the persistent `RBigint` object is allocated on the heap if it's not embedded. We check if the source `mpz_t` uses memory from the stack pool using `is_pool_memory`. If it does, we must perform a deep copy (`mpz_set`) to allocate new heap memory and copy the data, instead of moving the pointer (`mpz_move`). If the source is already on the heap, we retain the efficient `mpz_move`.
OSS-Fuzz testcase: https://oss-fuzz.com/testcase-detail/5279371075321856
add bounds check at retry label to prevent reading past end of format string
when parsing unterminated named parameters like %<foo without closing >
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Yukihiro "Matz" Matsumoto