whole lot of changes

bin/generate.py

@@ -195,6 +195,7 @@ def generate_use_case_library_conf(stories, detections, response_tasks, baseline
             story['detections'] = list(sto_det[story['name']])
 
         if story['name'] in sto_res:
+
             story['response_tasks'] = list(sto_res[story['name']])
             story['searches'] = story['detections'] + story['response_tasks']
         else:
@@ -271,12 +272,13 @@ def generate_workbench_panels(response_tasks, stories, TEMPLATE_PATH, OUTPUT_PAT
         if 'search' in response_task:
             if 'inputs' in response_task:
                 response_file_name = response_task['name'].replace(' ', '_').replace('-','_').replace('.','_').replace('/','_').lower()
+                response_file_name_xml = response_file_name + "___response_task.xml"
                 response_task['lowercase_name'] = response_file_name
                 workbench_panel_objects.append(response_task)
                 j2_env = Environment(loader=FileSystemLoader(TEMPLATE_PATH),
                                      trim_blocks=True)
                 template = j2_env.get_template('panel.j2')
-                file_path = "default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_" + response_file_name + ".xml"
+                file_path = "default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_" + response_file_name_xml 
                 output_path = path.join(OUTPUT_PATH, file_path)
                 response_task['search']= response_task['search'].replace(">",">")
                 response_task['search']= response_task['search'].replace("<","&lt;")
@@ -434,7 +436,7 @@ def map_response_tasks_to_stories(response_tasks):
                     if 'type' in response_task.keys():
                         task_name = str(response_task['type'] + ' - ' + response_task['name'] + ' - Response Task' )
                     else:
-                        task_name = str('ESCU - ' + response_task['name']  + ' - Response Task')
+                        task_name = str('ESCU - ' + response_task['name'] + ' - Response Task')
                     if not (story in sto_res):
                         sto_res[story] = {task_name}
                     else:

bin/jinja2_templates/es_investigations.j2

@@ -8,14 +8,14 @@ disabled = 0
 {% if story.workbench_panels is defined %}
 panels = {{ story.workbench_panels | tojson }}
 {% else %}
-panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history"]
+panels = ["panel://workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task"]
 {% endif %}
 
 {% endfor %}
 
 
 {% for response_task in response_tasks %}
-[panel://workbench_panel_{{ response_task.lowercase_name }}]
+[panel://workbench_panel_{{ response_task.lowercase_name }}___response_task]
 label = {{ response_task.name }}
 description = {{ response_task.description }}
 disabled = 0

bin/jinja2_templates/savedsearches.j2

@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ search = {{ baseline.search }}
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = {{ response_task.type | default('ESCU') }} - {{ response_task.name }}
+action.escu.full_search_name = {{ response_task.type | default('ESCU') }} - {{ response_task.name }} - Response Task
 description = {{ response_task.description }}
 action.escu.creation_date = {{ response_task.date }}
 action.escu.modification_date = {{ response_task.date }}

bin/jinja2_templates/workflow_actions.j2

@@ -1,15 +1,15 @@
 
 {% for response_task in response_tasks %}
 {% if response_task.inputs|length == 1 %}
-[workbench_panel_{{ response_task.lowercase_name }}]
+[workbench_panel_{{ response_task.lowercase_name }}___response_task]
 label                   = Workbench - {{ response_task.name }}
 type                    = link
 fields                  = {{ response_task.inputs[0] }}
 display_location        = field_menu
 {% if response_task.inputs[0] == "user" %}
-link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_identity=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_{{ response_task.lowercase_name }}&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
+link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_identity=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_{{ response_task.lowercase_name }}___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
 {% else %}
-link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_{{ response_task.lowercase_name }}&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
+link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_{{ response_task.lowercase_name }}___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
 {% endif %}
 link.target             = blank
 link.method             = get

package/default/analytic_stories.conf

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security-content
-# On Date: 2021-01-19T18:16:45 UTC
+# On Date: 2021-01-27T01:41:05 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - aws detect attach to role policy - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect permanent key creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect role creation - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts assume role abuse - Rule", "ESCU - aws detect sts get session token abuse - Rule"]
 mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1550"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity"]
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen AMI - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 AMIs", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Instance Types", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 AMIs"]
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Monitor your AWS EC2 instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or EC2 instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
@@ -53,8 +53,8 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonVPC/latest/UserGuide/VPC_Appendix_NACLs.html", "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-help-prepare-for-ddos-attacks-by-reducing-your-attack-surface/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Created with All Open Ports - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Network Access Control List Deleted - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Network ACL Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN", "ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS", "ESCU - Baseline of Network ACL Activity by ARN"]
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Monitor your AWS network infrastructure for bad configurations and malicious activity. Investigative searches help you probe deeper, when the facts warrant it.
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://aws.amazon.com/security-hub/features/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for EC2 Instance - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS Security Hub Alerts for User - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -85,12 +85,12 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Cloud Provisioning From Previously Unseen Region - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Provisioning Activity Sources"]
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Monitor your AWS provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your network.
-narrative = Because most enterprise AWS activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to whitelist specific IPs (because they vary).\
+narrative = Because most enterprise AWS activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary. \
 This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further.
 
 [AWS User Monitoring]
@@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect API activity from users without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS API Activities From Unapproved Accounts - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in AWS API Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in Security Group Activity - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new API calls from user roles - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "ID.AM", "PR.AC"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail", "ESCU - Baseline of API Calls per User ARN", "ESCU - Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN", "ESCU - Create a list of approved AWS service accounts"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of API Calls per User ARN", "ESCU - Create a list of approved AWS service accounts", "ESCU - Baseline of Security Group Activity by ARN", "ESCU - Previously seen API call per user roles in CloudTrail"]
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Detect and investigate dormant user accounts for your AWS environment that have become active again. Because inactive and ad-hoc accounts are common attack targets, it's critical to enable governance within your environment.
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/blob/v3.2/dev/rules/REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA.conf"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Suspicious Java Classes - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Content-Type Length - Rule", "ESCU - Web Servers Executing Suspicious Processes - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 18", "CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.RA", "PR.IP", "PR.MA", "PR.PT", "RS.MI"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/inventory-of-authorized-and-unauthorized-devices/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Unauthorized Assets by MAC address - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery", "Reconnaissance"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Count of assets by category"]
 data_models = ["Network_Sessions"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.zerofox.com/blog/what-is-digital-risk-monitoring/", "https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/consumer/family-safety/what-is-typosquatting/", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/06/explained-typosquatting/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Web Traffic For Brand Abuse - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Email Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names"]
 data_models = ["Email", "Network_Resolution", "Web"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -182,10 +182,10 @@ modification_date = 2019-10-02
 id = 3b96d13c-fdc7-45dd-b3ad-c132b31cdd2a
 version = 1
 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
-detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule"]
+detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created By Previously Unseen User - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created In Previously Unused Region - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Image - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Compute Instance Created With Previously Unseen Instance Type - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Creations By User - Initial", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Initial", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Instance Types - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Regions - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Compute Images - Update"]
 data_models = ["Change"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Monitor your cloud compute instances for activities related to cryptojacking/cryptomining. New instances that originate from previously unseen regions, users who launch abnormally high numbers of instances, or compute instances started by previously unseen users are just a few examples of potentially malicious behavior.
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.intego.com/mac-security-blog/osxcoldroot-and-the-rat-invasion/", "https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html", "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coldroot-rat-still-undetectable-despite-being-uploaded-on-github-two-years-ago/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection - Rule", "ESCU - Processes Tapping Keyboard Events - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 4", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Installation"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Collection", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Email files written outside of the Outlook directory - Rule", "ESCU - Email servers sending high volume traffic to hosts - Rule", "ESCU - Hosts receiving high volume of network traffic from email server - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to System Volume Information - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious writes to windows Recycle Bin - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036", "T1114.001", "T1114.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -239,8 +239,8 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Command-and-control-servers-The-puppet-masters-that-govern-malware"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Large Outbound ICMP Packets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048", "T1048.003", "T1071.001", "T1071.004", "T1095", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS", "ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK"]
 data_models = ["Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Detect and investigate tactics, techniques, and procedures leveraged by attackers to establish and operate command and control channels. Implants installed by attackers on compromised endpoints use these channels to receive instructions and send data back to the malicious operators.
@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1192/", "https://breakdev.org/evilginx-advanced-phishing-with-two-factor-authentication-bypass/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect DNS requests to Phishing Sites leveraging EvilGinx2 - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Certificate logs for a domain", "ESCU - Domain Certificate Investigation"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Domain Certificate Investigation - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Certificate logs for a domain - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Network_Resolution"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ version = 3
 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Access LSASS Memory for Dump Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Attempted Credential Dump From Registry via Reg exe - Rule", "ESCU - Create Remote Thread into LSASS - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Creation of Shadow Copy with wmic and powershell - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Copy Command from Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Credential Dumping via Symlink to Shadow Copy - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL - Rule", "ESCU - Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1003.002", "T1003.003", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Create local admin accounts using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Local Admin account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Single Letter Process On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1053.005", "T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1071.002", "T1112", "T1136.001", "T1204.002", "T1543.003", "T1547.001", "T1562.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process File Activity", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-088A", "https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/dns-amplification/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Large Volume of DNS ANY Queries - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1498.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Network_Resolution"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS record changed - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1071.004", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - DNS Hijack Enrichment - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Discover DNS records"]
 data_models = ["Network_Resolution"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1041"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.DS"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -382,8 +382,8 @@ id = 91c676cf-0b23-438d-abee-f6335e1fce33
 version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/data-protection/", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/dns/splunk-detect-dns-tunneling-37022", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect USB device insertion - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule"]
-mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.004", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Change_Analysis", "Network_Resolution"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1003", "https://github.com/SecuraBV/CVE-2020-1472", "https://www.secura.com/blog/zero-logon", "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Computer Changed with Anonymous Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Credential Dumping through LSASS access - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Zerologon via Zeek - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11", "CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1003.001", "T1190", "T1210"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -415,12 +415,12 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089", "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/11/vonteera-adware-uses-certificates-to-disable-anti-malware/", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Tools-Report.pdf"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Add Certificate To Untrusted Store - Rule", "ESCU - Attempt To Stop Security Service - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule", "ESCU - Unload Sysmon Filter Driver - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112", "T1543.003", "T1553.004", "T1562.001", "T1562.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Looks for activities and techniques associated with the disabling of security tools on a Windows system, such as suspicious `reg.exe` processes, processes launching netsh, and many others.
-narrative = Attackers employ a variety of tactics in order to avoid detection and operate without barriers. This often involves modifying the configuration of security tools to get around them or explicitly disabling them to prevent them from running. This Analytic Story includes searches that look for activity consistent with attackers attempting to disable various security mechanisms. Such activity may involve monitoring for suspicious registry activity, as this is where much of the configuration for Windows and various other programs reside, or explicitly attempting to shut down security-related services. Other times, attackers attempt various tricks to prevent specific programs from running, such as adding the certificates with which the security tools are signed to a blacklist (which would prevent them from running).
+narrative = Attackers employ a variety of tactics in order to avoid detection and operate without barriers. This often involves modifying the configuration of security tools to get around them or explicitly disabling them to prevent them from running. This Analytic Story includes searches that look for activity consistent with attackers attempting to disable various security mechanisms. Such activity may involve monitoring for suspicious registry activity, as this is where much of the configuration for Windows and various other programs reside, or explicitly attempting to shut down security-related services. Other times, attackers attempt various tricks to prevent specific programs from running, such as adding the certificates with which the security tools are signed to a block list (which would prevent them from running).
 
 [Dynamic DNS]
 category =  Malware
@@ -431,12 +431,12 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html", "https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2013/04/15/on-the-trail-of-malicious-dynamic-dns-domains/", "http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/11/dynamic-dns-can-use-2/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/08/04/detecting-dynamic-dns-domains-in-splunk.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect web traffic to dynamic domain providers - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1071.001", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Network_Resolution", "Web"]
 providing_technologies = none
-description = Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and blacklists.
-narrative = Dynamic DNS services (DDNS) are legitimate low-cost or free services that allow users to rapidly update domain resolutions to IP infrastructure. While their usage can be benign, malicious actors can abuse DDNS to host harmful payloads or interactive-command-and-control infrastructure. These attackers will manually update or automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to IP addresses that circumvent firewall blocks and blacklists and frustrate a network defender's analytic and investigative processes. These searches will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains and then investigate more deeply, when appropriate. While this list of top-level dynamic domains is not exhaustive, it can be dynamically updated as new suspicious dynamic domains are identified.
+description = Detect and investigate hosts in your environment that may be communicating with dynamic domain providers. Attackers may leverage these services to help them avoid firewall blocks and deny lists.
+narrative = Dynamic DNS services (DDNS) are legitimate low-cost or free services that allow users to rapidly update domain resolutions to IP infrastructure. While their usage can be benign, malicious actors can abuse DDNS to host harmful payloads or interactive-command-and-control infrastructure. These attackers will manually update or automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to IP addresses that circumvent firewall blocks and deny lists and frustrate a network defender's analytic and investigative processes. These searches will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains and then investigate more deeply, when appropriate. While this list of top-level dynamic domains is not exhaustive, it can be dynamically updated as new suspicious dynamic domains are identified.
 
 [Emotet Malware  DHS Report TA18-201A ]
 category =  Malware
@@ -447,7 +447,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-201A", "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Advanced-Incident-Detection-and-Threat-Hunting-using-Sysmon-and-Splunk.pdf", "https://www.vkremez.com/2017/05/emotet-banking-trojan-malware-analysis.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of tools built by NirSoft - Rule", "ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1059.003", "T1072", "T1547.001", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK"]
 data_models = ["Email", "Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -465,7 +465,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/about/news/f5-fixes-critical-vulnerability-discovered-by-positive-technologies-in-big-ip-application-delivery-controller/", "https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254", "https://blog.cloudflare.com/cve-2020-5902-helping-to-protect-against-the-f5-tmui-rce-vulnerability/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect F5 TMUI RCE CVE-2020-5902 - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -481,7 +481,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/understanding-service-accounts"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - GCP Detect accounts with high risk roles by project - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect gcploit framework - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Detect high risk permissions by resource and account - Rule", "ESCU - gcp detect oauth token abuse - Rule"]
 mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -498,9 +498,9 @@ id = baf7580b-d4b4-4774-8173-7d198e9da335
 version = 2
 reference = ["https://www.us-cert.gov/HIDDEN-COBRA-North-Korean-Malicious-Cyber-Activity", "https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Destructive-Malware-Report.pdf"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Create or delete windows shares using net exe - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious File Write - Rule"]
-mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021.002", "T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1070.005", "T1071.002", "T1071.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
+mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021.002", "T1048.003", "T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1070.005", "T1071.002", "T1071.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Monitor for and investigate activities, including the creation or deletion of hidden shares and file writes, that may be evidence of infiltration by North Korean government-sponsored cybercriminals. Details of this activity were reported in DHS Report TA-18-149A.
@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2016/09/hosts-file-hijacks/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Windows hosts file modification - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1071.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Network_Resolution"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -534,7 +534,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["http://www.deependresearch.org/2016/04/jboss-exploits-view-from-victim.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 18", "CIS 4"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1082"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.RA", "PR.IP", "PR.MA", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Web"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://github.com/splunk/cloud-datamodel-security-research"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes Pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster pod scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes cluster scan detection - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure pod scan fingerprint - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure scan fingerprint - Rule"]
 mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1526"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -580,7 +580,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS EKS Kubernetes cluster sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive object access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect service accounts forbidden failure access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect suspicious kubectl calls - Rule"]
 mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -596,7 +596,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/approaching-kubernetes-security-detecting-kubernetes-scan-with-splunk.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes AWS detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect RBAC authorization by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect most active service accounts by pod namespace - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes Azure detect sensitive role access - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect RBAC authorizations by account - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect most active service accounts by pod - Rule", "ESCU - Kubernetes GCP detect sensitive role access - Rule"]
 mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Lateral Movement"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -612,7 +612,7 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/08/malware_lateral_move.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Activity Related to Pass the Hash Attacks - Rule", "ESCU - Kerberoasting spn request with RC4 encryption - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Process Running On System - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1053.005", "T1550.002", "T1558.003"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -632,7 +632,7 @@ version = 4
 reference = ["https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Attempt To Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027", "T1059.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -657,8 +657,8 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/03/04/tracking-locky-ransomware-using-carbon-black/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Extended Period Without Successful Netbackup Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Unsuccessful Netbackup backups - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10"], "nist": ["PR.IP"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - All backup logs for host", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Unsuccessful Backups", "ESCU - Monitor Successful Backups"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["ESCU - Monitor Successful Backups", "ESCU - Monitor Unsuccessful Backups"]
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Address common concerns when monitoring your backup processes. These searches can help you reduce risks from ransomware, device theft, or denial of physical access to a host by backing up data on endpoints.
@@ -673,7 +673,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -690,7 +690,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://learn.cisecurity.org/20-controls-download"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - No Windows Updates in a time frame - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 18"], "nist": ["PR.MA", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Updates"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -708,7 +708,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/bb490939(v=technet.10)", "https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html", "http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Processes created by netsh - Rule", "ESCU - Processes launching netsh - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -741,14 +741,13 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/orangeworm-targets-healthcare-us-europe-asia", "https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/healthcare-targeted-by-hacker/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1543.003", "T1569.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update", "ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Detect activities and various techniques associated with the Orangeworm Attack Group, a group that frequently targets the healthcare industry.
 narrative = In May of 2018, the attack group Orangeworm was implicated for installing a custom backdoor called Trojan.Kwampirs within large international healthcare corporations in the United States, Europe, and Asia. This malware provides the attackers with remote access to the target system, decrypting and extracting a copy of its main DLL payload from its resource section. Before writing the payload to disk, it inserts a randomly generated string into the middle of the decrypted payload in an attempt to evade hash-based detections.\
 Awareness of the Orangeworm group first surfaced in January, 2015. It has conducted targeted attacks against related industries, as well, such as pharmaceuticals and healthcare IT solution providers.\
-Although the group's motivation is unknown, its goal may be stealing patient information to sell on the black market. Another possible explanation is corporate espionage. \
 Healthcare may be a promising target, because it is notoriously behind in technology, often using older operating systems and neglecting to patch computers. Even so, the group was able to evade detection for a full three years. Sources say that the malware spread quickly within the target networks, infecting computers used to control medical devices, such as MRI and X-ray machines.\
 This Analytic Story is designed to help you detect and investigate suspicious activities that may be indicative of an Orangeworm attack. One detection search looks for command-line arguments. Another monitors for uses of sc.exe, a non-essential Windows file that can manipulate Windows services. One of the investigative searches helps you get more information on web hosts that you suspect have been compromised.
 
@@ -761,7 +760,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/spear-phishing-campaign-targets-ukraine-government.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Oulook exe writing a  zip file - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious LNK file launching a process - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566.001", "T1566.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.DS"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -784,7 +783,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/scope-of-mudcarp-attacks-highlight-1/", "http://blog.amossys.fr/badflick-is-not-so-bad.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001", "T1059.003", "T1547.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -827,7 +826,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["http://www.novetta.com/2015/02/advanced-methods-to-detect-advanced-cyber-attacks-protocol-abuse/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Protocol or Port Mismatch - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048", "T1048.003", "T1071.001", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Network_Resolution", "Network_Traffic"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -843,7 +842,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10", "CIS 12", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.002", "T1036.003", "T1047", "T1048", "T1053.005", "T1070", "T1070.001", "T1071.001", "T1485", "T1490", "T1547.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of SMB Traffic - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -859,7 +858,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/", "https://github.com/d1vious/git-wild-hunt", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgzNib37g0M"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Detect Users creating keys with encrypt policy without MFA - Rule", "ESCU - AWS Detect Users with KMS keys performing encryption S3 - Rule"]
 mappings = {"mitre_attack": ["T1486"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -875,7 +874,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2015/09/the_new_route_toper.html", "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/event-response/synful-knock.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect ARP Poisoning - Rule", "ESCU - Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Login Attempts to Routers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Port Security Violation - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Software Download To Network Device - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Traffic Mirroring - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery", "Exploitation", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1020.001", "T1200", "T1498", "T1542.005", "T1557", "T1557.002"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Authentication", "Network_Traffic"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -892,7 +891,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-ryuk-using-splunk-attack-range.html", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/", "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-302a"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Ryuk Test Files Detected - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Security Account Manager Stopped - Rule", "ESCU - Windows connhost exe started forcefully - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Delivery", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1059.003", "T1485", "T1486", "T1489", "T1490", "T1562.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -908,7 +907,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/66.html", "https://www.incapsula.com/web-application-security/sql-injection.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - SQL Injection with Long URLs - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 18", "CIS 4"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1190"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.RA", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Web"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -925,7 +924,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/an-in-depth-analysis-of-samsam-ransomware-and-boss-spider/", "https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/07/31/samsam-the-almost-6-million-ransomware/", "https://thehackernews.com/2018/07/samsam-ransomware-attacks.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Batch File Write to System32 - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag - Rule", "ESCU - Detect attackers scanning for vulnerable JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect malicious requests to exploit JBoss servers - Rule", "ESCU - File with Samsam Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Software On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Bruteforce - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Samsam Test File Write - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10", "CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 18", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Delivery", "Installation", "Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001", "T1021.002", "T1082", "T1204.002", "T1485", "T1486", "T1490"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "ID.RA", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.MA", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic", "Web"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -946,7 +945,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://meltdownattack.com/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Spectre and Meltdown Vulnerable Systems - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 4"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.RA", "PR.IP", "RS.MI"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Systems Ready for Spectre-Meltdown Windows Patch"]
 data_models = ["Vulnerabilities"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -962,7 +961,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["http://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAPQ6#announce", "https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-4859"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Open Redirect in Splunk Web - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 18", "CIS 3", "CIS 4"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.RA", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT", "RS.MI"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -987,7 +986,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409", "https://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAP5E#VulnerabilityDescriptionsandRatings", "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44865/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Splunk Enterprise Information Disclosure - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 18", "CIS 3", "CIS 4"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.RA", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT", "RS.MI"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1007,7 +1006,7 @@ reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attac
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Outbound SMB Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks scheduling job on remote system - Rule", "ESCU - Sunburst Correlation DLL and Network Event - Rule", "ESCU - Supernova Webshell - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - Windows AdFind Exe - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 18", "CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 4", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 7", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exfiltration", "Exploitation", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1018", "T1027", "T1053.005", "T1059.003", "T1071.001", "T1071.002", "T1203", "T1505.003", "T1543.003", "T1569.002"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "ID.RA", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
 investigative_searches = []
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update"]
+support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint", "Network_Traffic", "Web"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Sunburst is a trojanized updates to SolarWinds Orion IT monitoring and management software. It was discovered by FireEye in December 2020. The actors behind this campaign gained access to numerous public and private organizations around the world.
@@ -1022,8 +1021,8 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Launched by User - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High AWS Instances Terminated by User - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started In Previously Unseen Region - Rule", "ESCU - EC2 Instance Started With Previously Unseen User - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Terminated by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Baseline of Excessive AWS Instances Launched by User - MLTK", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Regions", "ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Launches By User"]
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Use the searches in this Analytic Story to monitor your AWS EC2 instances for evidence of anomalous activity and suspicious behaviors, such as EC2 instances that originate from unusual locations or those launched by previously unseen users (among others). Included investigative searches will help you probe more deeply, when the information warrants it.
@@ -1038,8 +1037,8 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule", "ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004", "T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Update previously seen users in CloudTrail", "ESCU - Previously seen users in CloudTrail"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen users in CloudTrail", "ESCU - Update previously seen users in CloudTrail"]
 data_models = ["Authentication"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Monitor your AWS authentication events using your CloudTrail logs. Searches within this Analytic Story will help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious logins. 
@@ -1054,7 +1053,7 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cloud/public-aws-s3-buckets-writable/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect New Open S3 Buckets over AWS CLI - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open S3 buckets - Rule", "ESCU - Detect S3 access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Spike in S3 Bucket deletion - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of S3 Bucket deletion activity by ARN", "ESCU - Previously seen S3 bucket access by remote IP"]
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1072,7 +1071,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/hiding-cloudcobalt-strike-beacon-c2-using-amazon-apis/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Spike in blocked Outbound Traffic from your AWS - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 11"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of blocked outbound traffic from AWS"]
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1091,8 +1090,8 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-cloudtrail-now-tracks-cross-account-activity-to-its-origin/", "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Cross Account Activity From Previously Unseen Account - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by New User - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New City - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Country - Rule", "ESCU - Detect AWS Console Login by User from New Region - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Users In CloudTrail - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen AWS Cross Account Activity - Update"]
 data_models = ["Authentication"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Monitor your cloud authentication events. Searches within this Analytic Story leverage the recent cloud updates to the Authentication data model to help you stay aware of and investigate suspicious login activity. 
@@ -1108,8 +1107,8 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Launched - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Instance Modified By Previously Unseen User - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.DP", "ID.AM"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Instance Modifications By User - Update", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Launched", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Instances Destroyed"]
 data_models = ["Change"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
@@ -1124,12 +1123,12 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen City - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Country - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen IP Address - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud Provisioning Activity From Previously Unseen Region - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud Provisioning Activity Sources - Initial"]
 data_models = ["Change"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Monitor your cloud infrastructure provisioning activities for behaviors originating from unfamiliar or unusual locations. These behaviors may indicate that malicious activities are occurring somewhere within your cloud environment.
-narrative = Because most enterprise cloud infrastructure activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to whitelist specific IPs (because they vary).\
+narrative = Because most enterprise cloud infrastructure activities originate from familiar geographic locations, monitoring for activity from unknown or unusual regions is an important security measure. This indicator can be especially useful in environments where it is impossible to add specific IPs to an allow list because they vary.\
 This Analytic Story was designed to provide you with flexibility in the precision you employ in specifying legitimate geographic regions. It can be as specific as an IP address or a city, or as broad as a region (think state) or an entire country. By determining how precise you want your geographical locations to be and monitoring for new locations that haven't previously accessed your environment, you can detect adversaries as they begin to probe your environment. Since there are legitimate reasons for activities from unfamiliar locations, this is not a standalone indicator. Nevertheless, location can be a relevant piece of information that you may wish to investigate further.
 
 [Suspicious Cloud User Activities]
@@ -1141,8 +1140,8 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf", "https://redlock.io/blog/cryptojacking-tesla"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Security Group API Calls - Rule", "ESCU - Cloud API Calls From Previously Unseen User Roles - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "DE.DP", "ID.AM", "PR.AC"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Update", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Security Group API Calls Per User", "ESCU - Previously Seen Cloud API Calls Per User Role - Initial", "ESCU - Baseline Of Cloud Infrastructure API Calls Per User"]
 data_models = ["Change"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Detect and investigate suspicious activities by users and roles in your cloud environments.
@@ -1158,7 +1157,7 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059", "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/macro-malware", "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Use of cmd exe to Launch Script Interpreters - Rule", "ESCU - First time seen command line argument - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003", "T1059.001", "T1059.003"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1174,7 +1173,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["http://blogs.splunk.com/2015/10/01/random-words-on-entropy-and-dns/", "http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680", "https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/Threat-Vulnerability-Articles/What-are-suspicious-DNS-queries/ta-p/71454"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Clients Connecting to Multiple DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length Outliers - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Length With High Standard Deviation - Rule", "ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response - Rule", "ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule", "ESCU - Detection of DNS Tunnels - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive DNS Failures - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1", "CIS 12", "CIS 13", "CIS 3", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control"], "mitre_attack": ["T1048.003", "T1071.004", "T1189"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio", "ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task", "ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of DNS Query Length - MLTK"]
 data_models = ["Network_Resolution"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1190,7 +1189,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.splunk.com/blog/2015/06/26/phishing-hits-a-new-level-of-quality/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email - UBA Anomaly - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Email Attachment Extensions - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 3", "CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "mitre_attack": ["T1566", "T1566.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.IP"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Email Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - DNSTwist Domain Names"]
 data_models = ["Email", "UEBA"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1210,7 +1209,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/gcp/4-steps-for-hardening-your-cloud-storage-buckets-taking-charge-of-your-security", "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/gcp/google-cloud-platform-gcp-bucket-enumeration/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect GCP Storage access from a new IP - Rule", "ESCU - Detect New Open GCP Storage Buckets - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 13", "CIS 14"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1530"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1226,12 +1225,12 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1170"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - Detect mshta exe running scripts in command-line arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003", "T1218.005", "T1547.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously seen command line arguments", "ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Monitor and detect techniques used by attackers who leverage the mshta.exe process to execute malicious code.
-narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application white-listing solutions via the mshta.exe process, which executes Microsoft HTML applications with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility to eproxy execution of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\
+narrative = One common adversary tactic is to bypass application allow listing solutions via the mshta.exe process, which executes Microsoft HTML applications with the .hta suffix. In these cases, attackers use the trusted Windows utility to eproxy execution of malicious files, whether an .hta application, javascript, or VBScript.\
 One example of a notable mshta.exe attack was the Kovter malware (https://medium.com/@mbromileyDFIR/malware-monday-aebb456356c5) that was implicated in ransomware and click-fraud attacks. Kovter utilized .hta to execute a series of javascript commands, each progressively more dangerous. According to the Mitre Parternship Network (https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1170), FIN7 has leveraged mshta.exe, as has the MuddyWater group, who used it to execute its POWERSTATS payload (which then used the utility to execute additional payloads).\
 The searches in this story help you detect and investigate suspicious activity that may indicate that an attacker is leveraging mshta.exe to execute malicious code.
 
@@ -1244,7 +1243,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1078", "https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Credential_stuffing", "https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/answer/What-is-a-password-spraying-attack-and-how-does-it-work"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Multiple Okta Users With Invalid Credentails From The Same IP - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Account Lockout Events - Rule", "ESCU - Okta Failed SSO Attempts - Rule", "ESCU - Okta User Logins From Multiple Cities - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task", "ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1262,7 +1261,7 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Graeber-Abusing-Windows-Management-Instrumentation-WMI-To-Build-A-Persistent%20Asynchronous-And-Fileless-Backdoor-wp.pdf", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/wmimplant_a_wmi_ba.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1047", "T1546.003"], "nist": ["PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1280,7 +1279,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://redcanary.com/blog/windows-registry-attacks-threat-detection/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.001", "T1546.011", "T1546.012", "T1547.001", "T1547.010", "T1548.002", "T1564.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1298,7 +1297,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://blog.rapid7.com/2020/04/02/dispelling-zoom-bugbears-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-latest-zoom-vulnerabilities/", "https://threatpost.com/two-zoom-zero-day-flaws-uncovered/154337/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Prohibited Applications Spawning cmd exe - Rule", "ESCU - First Time Seen Child Process of Zoom - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.003", "T1068"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process File Activity"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Zoom Child Processes - Update"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1315,7 +1314,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/aws-security-best-practices.pdf"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - EC2 Instance Modified With Previously Unseen User - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 1"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["ID.AM"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId", "ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen EC2 Modifications By User"]
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1332,7 +1331,7 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/monitoring-windows-console-activity-part-two.html", "https://www.splunk.com/pdfs/technical-briefs/advanced-threat-detection-and-response-tech-brief.pdf", "https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/logging/detecting-security-incidents-windows-workstation-event-logs-34262"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Rare Executables - Rule", "ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule", "ESCU - RunDLL Loading DLL By Ordinal - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Command and Control", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1016", "T1036.003", "T1204.002", "T1218.011"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = ["ESCU - Baseline of Command Line Length - MLTK"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1350,7 +1349,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Protocols passing authentication in cleartext - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 14", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Reconnaissance"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Network_Traffic"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1366,7 +1365,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/internet-fraud", "https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2017-internet-crime-report-released-050718"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Web Fraud - Account Harvesting - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Anomalous User Clickspeed - Rule", "ESCU - Web Fraud - Password Sharing Across Accounts - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16", "CIS 6"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078", "T1136"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = []
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1387,7 +1386,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/resolving-your-way-into-domain-admin-exploiting-a-17-year-old-bug-in-windows-dns-servers/", "https://support.microsoft.com/en-au/help/4569509/windows-dns-server-remote-code-execution-vulnerability"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Splunk Stream - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Windows DNS SIGRed via Zeek - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 12", "CIS 16", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1203"], "nist": ["DE.CM"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Network_Resolution"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1403,7 +1402,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Defense_Evasion"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Disabling Remote User Account Control - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Reg exe Process - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1112", "T1222.001", "T1548.002", "T1564.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1419,7 +1418,7 @@ version = 1
 reference = ["https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/12/file-extensions-2/", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule", "ESCU - Execution of File with Multiple Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Changes to File Associations - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036.003", "T1546.001"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1439,7 +1438,7 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/", "https://zeltser.com/security-incident-log-review-checklist/", "http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2013/01/re-introducing-usnjrnl.html"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 10", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 6", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070", "T1070.001", "T1490"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "DE.DP", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1456,7 +1455,7 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/19.html", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2010/07/malware-persistence-windows-registry.html", "http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/common-malware-persistence-mechanisms/", "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html", "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dq2Hv7J9fvk"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe - Rule", "ESCU - Hiding Files And Directories With Attrib exe - Rule", "ESCU - Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe used to hide files directories via registry keys - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Registry Key modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database File Creation - Rule", "ESCU - Shim Database Installation With Suspicious Parameters - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1053.005", "T1222.001", "T1543.003", "T1546.011", "T1547.001", "T1547.010", "T1564.001", "T1574.009", "T1574.011"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1472,7 +1471,7 @@ version = 2
 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - Child Processes of Spoolsv exe - Rule", "ESCU - Overwriting Accessibility Binaries - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation - Rule", "ESCU - Uncommon Processes On Endpoint - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 5", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1068", "T1204.002", "T1546.008", "T1546.012"], "nist": ["DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.DS", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
 support_searches = []
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
@@ -1488,8 +1487,8 @@ version = 3
 reference = ["https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050", "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031"]
 detection_searches = ["ESCU - First Time Seen Running Windows Service - Rule", "ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule", "ESCU - Sc exe Manipulating Windows Services - Rule"]
 mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 3", "CIS 5", "CIS 8", "CIS 9"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives", "Installation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1543.003", "T1569.002", "T1574.011"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "DE.CM", "ID.AM", "PR.AC", "PR.AT", "PR.DS", "PR.IP", "PR.PT"]}
-investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info", "ESCU - Get Notable History"]
-support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update"]
+investigative_searches = ["ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task"]
+support_searches = ["ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Update", "ESCU - Previously Seen Running Windows Services - Initial"]
 data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 providing_technologies = none
 description = Windows services are often used by attackers for persistence and the ability to load drivers or otherwise interact with the Windows kernel. This Analytic Story helps you monitor your environment for indications that Windows services are being modified or created in a suspicious manner.

package/default/collections.conf

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security-content
-# On Date: 2021-01-19T18:16:45 UTC
+# On Date: 2021-01-27T01:41:05 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############

package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_source_user.xml

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-<panel>
-  <table>
-    <search>
-      <query>| search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail userIdentity.arn=$src_user$ | spath output=user path=userIdentity.arn | rename sourceIPAddress as src_ip | table _time, user, src_ip, awsRegion, eventName, errorCode, errorMessage</query>
-    </search>
-    <option name="drilldown">cell</option>
-    <option name="wrap">false</option>
-  </table>
-</panel>

package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_authentication_logs_for_endpoint.xml

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-<panel>
-  <table>
-    <search>
-      <query>| tstats count from datamodel=Authentication where Authentication.dest=$dest$ by _time, Authentication.dest, Authentication.user, Authentication.app, Authentication.action | `drop_dm_object_name("Authentication")`</query>
-    </search>
-    <option name="drilldown">cell</option>
-    <option name="wrap">false</option>
-  </table>
-</panel>

package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_notable_info.xml

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-<panel>
-  <table>
-    <search>
-      <query>| search `notable_by_id($event_id$)` | table time, rule_name, dest, dest_asset_id, dest_owner, priority, severity, owner, status_description</query>
-    </search>
-    <option name="drilldown">cell</option>
-    <option name="wrap">false</option>
-  </table>
-</panel>

package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_process_registry_activity.xml

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-<panel>
-  <table>
-    <search>
-      <query>| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name, values(Registry.dest) as dest, values(Registry.process_id) as process_id from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.process_id=$process_id$ AND Registry.dest=$dest$ by Registry.registry_path, Registry.action, _time | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | sort _time | table _time, process_id, dest, action, registry_key_name, registry_path</query>
-    </search>
-    <option name="drilldown">cell</option>
-    <option name="wrap">false</option>
-  </table>
-</panel>

package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_registry_activities.xml

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-<panel>
-  <table>
-    <search>
-      <query>| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.dest = "$dest$" by Registry.process_id Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Registry")` | join [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.user) as user values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = reg.exe by Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")`]</query>
-    </search>
-    <option name="drilldown">cell</option>
-    <option name="wrap">false</option>
-  </table>
-</panel>

package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_endpoint.xml

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-<panel>
-  <table>
-    <search>
-      <query>| from datamodel:Risk.All_Risk | search risk_object_type=system risk_object=$dest$ | stats count sum(risk_score) as risk_score values(search_name)  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`</query>
-    </search>
-    <option name="drilldown">cell</option>
-    <option name="wrap">false</option>
-  </table>
-</panel>

package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_risk_modifiers_for_user.xml

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-<panel>
-  <table>
-    <search>
-      <query>| from datamodel:Risk.All_Risk | search risk_object_type=user risk_object=$user$ | stats count sum(risk_score) as risk_score values(search_name)  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by risk_object |`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` </query>
-    </search>
-    <option name="drilldown">cell</option>
-    <option name="wrap">false</option>
-  </table>
-</panel>

package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_update_logs_for_endpoint.xml

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-<panel>
-  <table>
-    <search>
-      <query>| from datamodel Updates.Updates  | search (vendor_product="Microsoft Windows" OR vendor_product="OSX:Update" OR vendor_product="Linux:Update") dest=$dest$</query>
-    </search>
-    <option name="drilldown">cell</option>
-    <option name="wrap">false</option>
-  </table>
-</panel>

package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_user_information_from_identity_table.xml

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-<panel>
-  <table>
-    <search>
-      <query>| `identities` | search identity=$user$ | table _time, identity, first, last, email, category, watchlist</query>
-    </search>
-    <option name="drilldown">cell</option>
-    <option name="wrap">false</option>
-  </table>
-</panel>

package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_get_vulnerability_logs_for_endpoint.xml

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-<panel>
-  <table>
-    <search>
-      <query>| from datamodel Vulnerabilities.Vulnerabilities | search dest=$dest$</query>
-    </search>
-    <option name="drilldown">cell</option>
-    <option name="wrap">false</option>
-  </table>
-</panel>

package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_aws_ecr_container_listing_activity.xml

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-<panel>
-  <table>
-    <search>
-      <query>|tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Cloud_Infrastructure.Compute where Compute.user_type!="AssumeRole" AND Compute.event_name="ListImages" by Compute.image_id Compute.src_user Compute.src Compute.http_user_agent Compute.user_type | rename "Compute.*" as * |stats values(http_user_agent) as http_user_agent distinct_count(http_user_agent) as unique_ua_count by src_user, image_id, src, user_type | where unique_ua_count &gt; 1</query>
-    </search>
-    <option name="drilldown">cell</option>
-    <option name="wrap">false</option>
-  </table>
-</panel>

package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_cloud_compute_instance_activities.xml

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-<panel>
-  <table>
-    <search>
-      <query>| from datamodel:Cloud_Infrastructure.Compute | search dest=$dest$ | fields - _*</query>
-    </search>
-    <option name="drilldown">cell</option>
-    <option name="wrap">false</option>
-  </table>
-</panel>

package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_all_cloud_regions.xml

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-<panel>
-  <table>
-    <search>
-      <query>| from datamodel:Cloud_Infrastructure.Compute | search user=$src_user$ | fields - _*</query>
-    </search>
-    <option name="drilldown">cell</option>
-    <option name="wrap">false</option>
-  </table>
-</panel>

package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_single_cloud_region.xml

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-<panel>
-  <table>
-    <search>
-      <query>| from datamodel:Cloud_Infrastructure.Compute | search region=$region$ user=$src_user$ | fields - _*</query>
-    </search>
-    <option name="drilldown">cell</option>
-    <option name="wrap">false</option>
-  </table>
-</panel>

package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_host.xml

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-<panel>
-  <table>
-    <search>
-      <query>| from datamodel Web.Web | search src=$dest$</query>
-    </search>
-    <option name="drilldown">cell</option>
-    <option name="wrap">false</option>
-  </table>
-</panel>

package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_investigate_web_activity_from_src_ip.xml

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-<panel>
-  <table>
-    <search>
-      <query>| from datamodel Web.Web | search src=$src_ip$</query>
-    </search>
-    <option name="drilldown">cell</option>
-    <option name="wrap">false</option>
-  </table>
-</panel>

package/default/data/ui/panels/workbench_panel_process_chain_analysis.xml

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-<panel>
-  <table>
-    <search>
-      <query>`sysmon` EventCode=1 NOT process=*Splunk* | rename process_guid AS out_process_guid process_name AS out_process_name parent_process_guid AS out_parent_process_guid parent_process_name AS out_parent_process_name | stats count by out_process_guid out_process_name out_parent_process_guid out_parent_process_name | eval join_process_guid = out_process_guid | join join_process_guid [ search `sysmon` process_guid={process_guid} EventCode=1 | rename process_name AS sub_process_name process_guid AS sub_process_guid parent_process_name AS sub_parent_process_name parent_process_guid AS sub_parent_process_guid | stats count by sub_process_name sub_process_guid sub_parent_process_name sub_parent_process_guid | eval join_process_guid = sub_parent_process_guid] | rename sub_process_guid AS process_guid sub_process_name AS process_name out_process_guid AS parent_process_guid out_process_name AS parent_process_name out_parent_process_guid AS grandparent_process_guid out_parent_process_name AS grandparent_process_name | stats count by process_guid process_name parent_process_guid parent_process_name grandparent_process_guid grandparent_process_name | head 1 | fields - count</query>
-    </search>
-    <option name="drilldown">cell</option>
-    <option name="wrap">false</option>
-  </table>
-</panel>

package/default/macros.conf

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security-content
-# On Date: 2021-01-19T18:16:45 UTC
+# On Date: 2021-01-27T01:41:05 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
@@ -98,9 +98,9 @@ description = This limits the query fields to domains that are associated with e
 definition = index=netops sourcetype="f5:bigip:rogue"
 description = customer specific splunk configurations(eg- index, source, sourcetype). Replace the macro definition with configurations for your Splunk Environmnent.
 
-[filter_rare_process_whitelist]
-definition = lookup update=true lookup_rare_process_whitelist_default process as process OUTPUTNEW whitelist | where whitelist="false" | lookup update=true lookup_rare_process_whitelist_local process as process OUTPUT whitelist | where whitelist="false"
-description = This macro is intended to whitelist processes that have been definied as rare
+[filter_rare_process_allow_list]
+definition = lookup update=true lookup_rare_process_allow_list_default process as process OUTPUTNEW allow_list | where allow_list="false" | lookup update=true lookup_rare_process_allow_list_local process as process OUTPUT allow_list | where allow_list="false"
+description = This macro is intended to allow_list processes that have been definied as rare
 
 [google_gcp_pubnet_message]
 definition = sourcetype="google:gcp:pubsub:message"

package/default/savedsearches.conf

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security-content
-# On Date: 2021-01-19T18:16:45 UTC
+# On Date: 2021-01-27T01:41:05 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
@@ -642,7 +642,7 @@ action.escu.confidence = high
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule
 action.escu.search_type = detection
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
-action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", "Cloud Cryptomining"]
+action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities"]
 action.risk = 1
 action.risk.param._risk_object = user
 action.risk.param._risk_object_type = user
@@ -653,7 +653,7 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 action.correlationsearch.enabled = 1
 action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Abnormally High Number Of Cloud Instances Destroyed - Rule
-action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytics_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities", "Cloud Cryptomining"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]}
+action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytics_story": ["Suspicious Cloud Instance Activities"], "cis20": ["CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]}
 schedule_window = auto
 action.notable = 1
 action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user']
@@ -2065,7 +2065,7 @@ relation = greater than
 quantity = 0
 realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
-search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query DNS.record_type |  `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | eval query_length = len(query) | table query query_length record_type count | eventstats stdev(query_length) AS stdev avg(query_length) AS avg p50(query_length) AS p50| where query_length>(avg+stdev*2) | eval z_score=(query_length-avg)/stdev | `dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation_filter` 
+search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Network_Resolution by DNS.query |  `drop_dm_object_name("DNS")` | eval query_length = len(query) | table query query_length record_type count | eventstats stdev(query_length) AS stdev avg(query_length) AS avg p50(query_length) AS p50| where query_length>(avg+stdev*2) | eval z_score=(query_length-avg)/stdev | `dns_query_length_with_high_standard_deviation_filter` 
 
 [ESCU - DNS Query Requests Resolved by Unauthorized DNS Servers - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
@@ -2334,7 +2334,7 @@ description = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login ev
 action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]}
 action.escu.data_models = ["Authentication"]
 action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour
-action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Update previously seen users in CloudTrail` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines.
+action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines.
 action.escu.known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-05-28
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-05-28
@@ -2378,7 +2378,7 @@ description = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login ev
 action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]}
 action.escu.data_models = ["Authentication"]
 action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour
-action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously seen users in CloudTrail - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen users in Cloudtrail - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter` macro.
+action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_city_filter` macro.
 action.escu.known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-10-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-07
@@ -2422,7 +2422,7 @@ description = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login ev
 action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]}
 action.escu.data_models = ["Authentication"]
 action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour
-action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously seen users in CloudTrail - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen users in Cloudtrail - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter` macro.
+action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_country_filter` macro.
 action.escu.known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-10-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-07
@@ -2466,7 +2466,7 @@ description = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login ev
 action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1535"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]}
 action.escu.data_models = ["Authentication"]
 action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour
-action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting your cloud infrastructure logs from your cloud provider. You should run the baseline search `Previously seen users in CloudTrail - Initial` to build the initial table of source IP address, geographic locations, and times. You must also enable the second baseline search `Previously Seen users in Cloudtrail - Update` to keep this table up to date and to age out old data. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter` macro.
+action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install and configure the Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 5.1.0 or later) and Enterprise Security 6.2, which contains the required updates to the Authentication data model for cloud use cases. Run the `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Initial` support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run `Previously Seen Users in CloudTrail - Update` hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines. You can also provide additional filtering for this search by customizing the `detect_aws_console_login_by_user_from_new_region_filter` macro.
 action.escu.known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-10-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-10-07
@@ -2861,7 +2861,7 @@ action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 9", "CIS 12"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Com
 action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Traffic"]
 action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for outbound ICMP packets with a packet size larger than 1,000 bytes. Various threat actors have been known to use ICMP as a command and control channel for their attack infrastructure. Large ICMP packets from an endpoint to a remote host may be indicative of this activity.
 action.escu.how_to_implement = In order to run this search effectively, we highly recommend that you leverage the Assets and Identity framework. It is important that you have a good understanding of how your network segments are designed and that you are able to distinguish internal from external address space. Add a category named `internal` to the CIDRs that host the company's assets in the `assets_by_cidr.csv` lookup file, which is located in `$SPLUNK_HOME/etc/apps/SA-IdentityManagement/lookups/`. More information on updating this lookup can be found here: https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/5.0.0/Admin/Addassetandidentitydata. This search also requires you to be ingesting your network traffic and populating the Network_Traffic data model
-action.escu.known_false_positives = ICMP packets are used in a variety of ways to help troubleshoot networking issues and ensure the proper flow of traffic. As such, it is possible that a large ICMP packet could be perfectly legitimate. If large ICMP packets are associated with command and control traffic, there will typically be a large number of these packets observed over time. If the search is providing a large number of false positives, you can modify the search to adjust the byte threshold or whitelist specific IP addresses, as necessary.
+action.escu.known_false_positives = ICMP packets are used in a variety of ways to help troubleshoot networking issues and ensure the proper flow of traffic. As such, it is possible that a large ICMP packet could be perfectly legitimate. If large ICMP packets are associated with command and control traffic, there will typically be a large number of these packets observed over time. If the search is providing a large number of false positives, you can modify the macro `detect_large_outbound_icmp_packets_filter` to adjust the byte threshold or add specific IP addresses to an allow list.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-06-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-06-01
 action.escu.confidence = high
@@ -2916,7 +2916,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytics_story": ["Suspicious DNS Traf
 schedule_window = auto
 action.notable = 1
 action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest', 'src']
-action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is used to detect attempts to use DNS tunneling, by calculating the length of responses to DNS TXT queries. Endpoints using DNS as a method of transmission for data exfiltration, command and control, or evasion of security controls can often be detected by noting unusually large volumes of DNS traffic.
+action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is used to detect attempts to use DNS tunneling, by calculating the length of responses to DNS TXT queries. Endpoints using DNS as a method of transmission for data exfiltration, command and control, or evasion of security controls can often be detected by noting unusually large volumes of DNS traffic. Deprecated because this detection should focus on DNS queries instead of DNS responses.
 action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect Long DNS TXT Record Response
 action.notable.param.security_domain = network
 action.notable.param.severity = high
@@ -3438,8 +3438,8 @@ description = This search will return a table of rare processes, the names of th
 action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 2", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "nist": ["ID.AM", "PR.PT", "PR.DS", "DE.CM"]}
 action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 action.escu.eli5 = This search will return a table of rare processes, the names of the systems running them, and the users who initiated each process.
-action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts and populating the endpoint data model with the resultant dataset. The macro `filter_rare_process_whitelist` searches two lookup files to whitelist your processes.  These consist of `rare_process_whitelist_default.csv` and `rare_process_whitelist_local.csv`. To add your own processes to the whitelist, add them to `rare_process_whitelist_local.csv`. If you wish to remove an entry from the default lookup file, you will have to modify the macro itself to set the whitelist value for that process to false. You can modify the limit parameter and search scheduling to better suit your environment.
-action.escu.known_false_positives = Some legitimate processes may be only rarely executed in your environment. As these are identified, update `rare_process_whitelist_local.csv` to filter them out of your search results.
+action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts and populating the endpoint data model with the resultant dataset. The macro `filter_rare_process_allow_list` searches two lookup files for allowed processes.  These consist of `rare_process_allow_list_default.csv` and `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv`. To add your own processes to the allow list, add them to `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv`. If you wish to remove an entry from the default lookup file, you will have to modify the macro itself to set the allow_list value for that process to false. You can modify the limit parameter and search scheduling to better suit your environment.
+action.escu.known_false_positives = Some legitimate processes may be only rarely executed in your environment. As these are identified, update `rare_process_allow_list_local.csv` to filter them out of your search results.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-03-16
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-03-16
 action.escu.confidence = high
@@ -3468,7 +3468,7 @@ relation = greater than
 quantity = 0
 realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
-search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.dest) as dest values(Processes.user) as user min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name  | rename Processes.process_name as process | rex field=user "(?<user_domain>.*)\\\\(?<user_name>.*)" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| search [| tstats count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name | rare Processes.process_name limit=30 | rename Processes.process_name as process| `filter_rare_process_whitelist`| table process ] | `detect_rare_executables_filter` 
+search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.dest) as dest values(Processes.user) as user min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name  | rename Processes.process_name as process | rex field=user "(?<user_domain>.*)\\\\(?<user_name>.*)" | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| search [| tstats count from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by Processes.process_name | rare Processes.process_name limit=30 | rename Processes.process_name as process| `filter_rare_process_allow_list`| table process ] | `detect_rare_executables_filter` 
 
 [ESCU - Detect Rogue DHCP Server - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
@@ -4242,10 +4242,10 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
 [ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
-description = Malicious actors often abuse legitimate Dynamic DNS services to host malicious payloads or interactive command and control nodes. Attackers will automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to countless IP addresses to circumvent firewall blocks, blacklists as well as frustrate a network defenders analytic and investigative processes. This search will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains.
+description = Malicious actors often abuse legitimate Dynamic DNS services to host malicious payloads or interactive command and control nodes. Attackers will automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to countless IP addresses to circumvent firewall blocks, block lists as well as frustrate a network defenders analytic and investigative processes. This search will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains.
 action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1189"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]}
 action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Resolution"]
-action.escu.eli5 = Malicious actors often abuse legitimate Dynamic DNS services to host malicious payloads or interactive command and control nodes. Attackers will automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to countless IP addresses to circumvent firewall blocks, blacklists as well as frustrate a network defenders analytic and investigative processes. This search will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains.
+action.escu.eli5 = Malicious actors often abuse legitimate Dynamic DNS services to host malicious payloads or interactive command and control nodes. Attackers will automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to countless IP addresses to circumvent firewall blocks, block lists as well as frustrate a network defenders analytic and investigative processes. This search will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains.
 action.escu.how_to_implement = First, you'll need to ingest data from your DNS operations. This can be done by ingesting logs from your server or data, collected passively by Splunk Stream or a similar solution. Specifically, data that contains the domain that is being queried and the IP of the host originating the request must be populating the `Network_Resolution` data model. This search also leverages a lookup file, `dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv`, which contains a non-exhaustive list of Dynamic DNS providers. Please consider updating the local lookup periodically by adding new domains to the list of `dynamic_dns_providers_local.csv`.\
 This search produces fields (query, answer, isDynDNS) that are not yet supported by ES Incident Review and therefore cannot be viewed when a notable event is raised. These fields contribute additional context to the notable event. To see the additional metadata, add the following fields, if not already present, to Incident Review. Event Attributes (Configure > Incident Management > Incident Review Settings > Add New Entry):\\n1. **Label:** DNS Query, **Field:** query\
 1. \
@@ -4269,7 +4269,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domai
 action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytics_story": ["Data Protection", "Prohibited Traffic Allowed or Protocol Mismatch", "DNS Hijacking", "Suspicious DNS Traffic", "Dynamic DNS", "Command and Control"], "cis20": ["CIS 8", "CIS 12", "CIS 13"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1189"], "nist": ["PR.DS", "PR.PT", "DE.AE", "DE.CM"]}
 schedule_window = auto
 action.notable = 1
-action.notable.param.rule_description = Malicious actors often abuse legitimate Dynamic DNS services to host malicious payloads or interactive command and control nodes. Attackers will automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to countless IP addresses to circumvent firewall blocks, blacklists as well as frustrate a network defenders analytic and investigative processes. This search will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains.
+action.notable.param.rule_description = Malicious actors often abuse legitimate Dynamic DNS services to host malicious payloads or interactive command and control nodes. Attackers will automate domain resolution changes by routing dynamic domains to countless IP addresses to circumvent firewall blocks, block lists as well as frustrate a network defenders analytic and investigative processes. This search will look for DNS queries made from within your infrastructure to suspicious dynamic domains.
 action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers
 action.notable.param.security_domain = network
 action.notable.param.severity = high
@@ -4408,10 +4408,10 @@ search = `cloudtrail` eventType=AwsApiCall errorCode=success userIdentity.type=A
 [ESCU - Detect new user AWS Console Login - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
-description = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour
+description = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour. Deprecated now this search is updated to use the Authentication datamodel.
 action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1078.004"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]}
 action.escu.data_models = []
-action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour
+action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour. Deprecated now this search is updated to use the Authentication datamodel.
 action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Run the "Previously seen users in CloudTrail" support search only once to create a baseline of previously seen IAM users within the last 30 days. Run "Update previously seen users in CloudTrail" hourly (or more frequently depending on how often you run the detection searches) to refresh the baselines.
 action.escu.known_false_positives = When a legitimate new user logins for the first time, this activity will be detected. Check how old the account is and verify that the user activity is legitimate.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-21
@@ -4430,7 +4430,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytics_story": ["Suspicious AWS Logi
 schedule_window = auto
 action.notable = 1
 action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user']
-action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour
+action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for CloudTrail events wherein a console login event by a user was recorded within the last hour, then compares the event to a lookup file of previously seen users (by ARN values) who have logged into the console. The alert is fired if the user has logged into the console for the first time within the last hour. Deprecated now this search is updated to use the Authentication datamodel.
 action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect new user AWS Console Login
 action.notable.param.security_domain = network
 action.notable.param.severity = high
@@ -4442,7 +4442,7 @@ relation = greater than
 quantity = 0
 realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
-search = `cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins  | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user | eval userStatus=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), "First Time Logging into AWS Console","Previously Seen User") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| where userStatus ="First Time Logging into AWS Console"  | `detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter`
+search = `cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail  | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user | eval userStatus=if(firstTime >= relative_time(now(), "-70m@m"), "First Time Logging into AWS Console","Previously Seen User") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| where userStatus ="First Time Logging into AWS Console"  | `detect_new_user_aws_console_login_filter`
 
 [ESCU - Detect processes used for System Network Configuration Discovery - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
@@ -4549,7 +4549,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytics_story": ["Data Protection", "
 schedule_window = auto
 action.notable = 1
 action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['src']
-action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is used to detect DNS tunneling, by calculating the sum of the length of DNS queries and DNS answers. The search also filters out potential false positives by filtering out queries made to internal systems and the queries originating from internal DNS, Web, and Email servers. Endpoints using DNS as a method of transmission for data exfiltration, command and control, or evasion of security controls can often be detected by noting an unusually large volume of DNS traffic.
+action.notable.param.rule_description = This search is used to detect DNS tunneling, by calculating the sum of the length of DNS queries and DNS answers. The search also filters out potential false positives by filtering out queries made to internal systems and the queries originating from internal DNS, Web, and Email servers. Endpoints using DNS as a method of transmission for data exfiltration, command and control, or evasion of security controls can often be detected by noting an unusually large volume of DNS traffic. Deprecated because existing detection is doing the same.
 action.notable.param.rule_title = Detection of DNS Tunnels
 action.notable.param.security_domain = network
 action.notable.param.severity = high
@@ -5576,10 +5576,10 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) values(Proce
 [ESCU - High Number of Login Failures from a single source - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
-description = This search will detect more than 5 login failures in Office365 Azure Active Directory from a single source IP address. Please adjust the threshold value of 5 as suited for your environment. Deprecated because duplicate.
+description = This search will detect more than 5 login failures in Office365 Azure Active Directory from a single source IP address. Please adjust the threshold value of 5 as suited for your environment.
 action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1110.001"], "nist": ["DE.DP", "DE.AE"]}
 action.escu.data_models = []
-action.escu.eli5 = This search will detect more than 5 login failures in Office365 Azure Active Directory from a single source IP address. Please adjust the threshold value of 5 as suited for your environment. Deprecated because duplicate.
+action.escu.eli5 = This search will detect more than 5 login failures in Office365 Azure Active Directory from a single source IP address. Please adjust the threshold value of 5 as suited for your environment.
 action.escu.how_to_implement = none
 action.escu.known_false_positives = unknown
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-12-16
@@ -6501,7 +6501,7 @@ action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation"
 action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for processes referencing the plist files that determine which applications are re-opened when a user reboots their machine.
 action.escu.how_to_implement = In order to properly run this search, Splunk needs to ingest process data from your osquery deployed agents with the [splunk.conf](https://github.com/splunk/TA-osquery/blob/master/config/splunk.conf) pack enabled. Also the [TA-OSquery](https://github.com/splunk/TA-osquery) must be deployed across your indexers and universal forwarders in order to have the data populate the Endpoint data model.
-action.escu.known_false_positives = At this stage, there are no known false positives. During testing, no process events refering the com.apple.loginwindow.plist files were observed during normal operation of re-opening applications on reboot. Therefore, it can be asumed that any occurences of this in the process events would be worth investigating. In the event that the legitimate modification by the system of these files is in fact logged to the process log, then the process_name of that process can be whitelisted.
+action.escu.known_false_positives = At this stage, there are no known false positives. During testing, no process events refering the com.apple.loginwindow.plist files were observed during normal operation of re-opening applications on reboot. Therefore, it can be asumed that any occurences of this in the process events would be worth investigating. In the event that the legitimate modification by the system of these files is in fact logged to the process log, then the process_name of that process can be added to an allow list.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-02-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-02-07
 action.escu.confidence = high
@@ -6641,15 +6641,15 @@ relation = greater than
 quantity = 0
 realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
-search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process_id) as process_id, values(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=powershell.exe AND (Processes.process="* -ex*" OR Processes.process="* bypass *") by Processes.process_id, Processes.user, Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass_filter`
+search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process_id) as process_id, values(Processes.parent_process_id) as parent_process_id values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=powershell.exe (Processes.process="* -ex*" OR Processes.process="* bypass *") by Processes.process_id, Processes.user, Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass_filter`
 
 [ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
-description = This search looks for PowerShell processes started with a base64 encoded command-line passed to it, with parameters to modify the execution policy for the process, and those that prevent the display of an interactive prompt to the user. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it overrides the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide itself from the user, and passes an encoded script to be run on the command-line.
+description = This search looks for PowerShell processes started with a base64 encoded command-line passed to it, with parameters to modify the execution policy for the process, and those that prevent the display of an interactive prompt to the user. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it overrides the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide itself from the user, and passes an encoded script to be run on the command-line. Deprecated because almost the same as Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command
 action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]}
 action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
-action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for PowerShell processes started with a base64 encoded command-line passed to it, with parameters to modify the execution policy for the process, and those that prevent the display of an interactive prompt to the user. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it overrides the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide itself from the user, and passes an encoded script to be run on the command-line.
+action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for PowerShell processes started with a base64 encoded command-line passed to it, with parameters to modify the execution policy for the process, and those that prevent the display of an interactive prompt to the user. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it overrides the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide itself from the user, and passes an encoded script to be run on the command-line. Deprecated because almost the same as Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command
 action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model.
 action.escu.known_false_positives = Legitimate process can have this combination of command-line options, but it's not common.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-19
@@ -6668,7 +6668,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytics_story": ["Malicious PowerShel
 schedule_window = auto
 action.notable = 1
 action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['user', 'dest']
-action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for PowerShell processes started with a base64 encoded command-line passed to it, with parameters to modify the execution policy for the process, and those that prevent the display of an interactive prompt to the user. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it overrides the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide itself from the user, and passes an encoded script to be run on the command-line.
+action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for PowerShell processes started with a base64 encoded command-line passed to it, with parameters to modify the execution policy for the process, and those that prevent the display of an interactive prompt to the user. This combination of command-line options is suspicious because it overrides the default PowerShell execution policy, attempts to hide itself from the user, and passes an encoded script to be run on the command-line. Deprecated because almost the same as Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command
 action.notable.param.rule_title = Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments
 action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint
 action.notable.param.severity = high
@@ -6689,7 +6689,7 @@ description = This search looks for PowerShell processes launched with arguments
 action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 7", "CIS 8"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Command and Control", "Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.001"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "DE.CM", "PR.IP"]}
 action.escu.data_models = ["Endpoint"]
 action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for PowerShell processes launched with arguments that have characters indicative of obfuscation on the command-line.
-action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model. Deprecated because the detection need rework and would need to work base on powershell logs.
+action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model in the Processes node. You must also be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. The command-line arguments are mapped to the "process" field in the Endpoint data model.
 action.escu.known_false_positives = These characters might be legitimately on the command-line, but it is not common.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2021-01-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2021-01-19
@@ -6719,8 +6719,7 @@ relation = greater than
 quantity = 0
 realtime_schedule = 0
 is_visible = false
-search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=powershell.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval num_obfuscation = (mvcount(split(process,"`"))-1) + (mvcount(split(process, "^"))-1) + (mvcount(split(process, "'"))-1) | `malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques_filter` | search num_obfuscation > 10
-
+search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=powershell.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| eval num_obfuscation = (mvcount(split(process,"`"))-1) + (mvcount(split(process, "^"))-1) + (mvcount(split(process, "'"))-1) | `malicious_powershell_process_with_obfuscation_techniques_filter` | search num_obfuscation > 10 
 
 [ESCU - Monitor DNS For Brand Abuse - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
@@ -8040,10 +8039,10 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
 [ESCU - Remote Desktop Network Traffic - Rule]
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
-description = This search looks for network traffic on TCP/3389, the default port used by remote desktop. While remote desktop traffic is not uncommon on a network, it is usually associated with known hosts. This search allows for whitelisting both source and destination hosts to remove them from the output of the search so you can focus on the uncommon uses of remote desktop on your network.
+description = This search looks for network traffic on TCP/3389, the default port used by remote desktop. While remote desktop traffic is not uncommon on a network, it is usually associated with known hosts. This search will ignore common RDP sources and common RDP destinations so you can focus on the uncommon uses of remote desktop on your network.
 action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 9", "CIS 16"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.001"], "nist": ["DE.AE", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]}
 action.escu.data_models = ["Network_Traffic"]
-action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for network traffic on TCP/3389, the default port used by remote desktop. While remote desktop traffic is not uncommon on a network, it is usually associated with known hosts. This search allows for whitelisting both source and destination hosts to remove them from the output of the search so you can focus on the uncommon uses of remote desktop on your network.
+action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for network traffic on TCP/3389, the default port used by remote desktop. While remote desktop traffic is not uncommon on a network, it is usually associated with known hosts. This search will ignore common RDP sources and common RDP destinations so you can focus on the uncommon uses of remote desktop on your network.
 action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to identify systems that commonly originate remote desktop traffic and that commonly receive remote desktop traffic. You can use the included support search "Identify Systems Creating Remote Desktop Traffic" to identify systems that originate the traffic and the search "Identify Systems Receiving Remote Desktop Traffic" to identify systems that receive a lot of remote desktop traffic. After identifying these systems, you will need to add the "common_rdp_source" or "common_rdp_destination" category to that system depending on the usage, using the Enterprise Security Assets and Identities framework.  This can be done by adding an entry in the assets.csv file located in SA-IdentityManagement/lookups.
 action.escu.known_false_positives = Remote Desktop may be used legitimately by users on the network.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-07
@@ -8062,7 +8061,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytics_story": ["SamSam Ransomware",
 schedule_window = auto
 action.notable = 1
 action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest', 'src']
-action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for network traffic on TCP/3389, the default port used by remote desktop. While remote desktop traffic is not uncommon on a network, it is usually associated with known hosts. This search allows for whitelisting both source and destination hosts to remove them from the output of the search so you can focus on the uncommon uses of remote desktop on your network.
+action.notable.param.rule_description = This search looks for network traffic on TCP/3389, the default port used by remote desktop. While remote desktop traffic is not uncommon on a network, it is usually associated with known hosts. This search will ignore common RDP sources and common RDP destinations so you can focus on the uncommon uses of remote desktop on your network.
 action.notable.param.rule_title = Remote Desktop Network Traffic
 action.notable.param.security_domain = network
 action.notable.param.severity = high
@@ -9099,7 +9098,7 @@ action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "
 action.escu.data_models = ["UEBA"]
 action.escu.eli5 = This detection looks for emails that are suspicious because of their sender, domain rareness, or behavior differences. This is an anomaly generated by Splunk User Behavior Analytics (UBA).
 action.escu.how_to_implement = You must be ingesting data from email logs and have Splunk integrated with UBA. This anomaly is raised by a UBA detection model called  "SuspiciousEmailDetectionModel." Ensure that this model is enabled on your UBA instance.
-action.escu.known_false_positives = This detection model will alert on any sender domain that is seen for the first time. This could be a potential false positive. The next step is to investigate and whitelist the URL if you determine that it is a legitimate sender.
+action.escu.known_false_positives = This detection model will alert on any sender domain that is seen for the first time. This could be a potential false positive. The next step is to investigate and add the URL to an allow list if you determine that it is a legitimate sender.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-07-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-07-22
 action.escu.confidence = high
@@ -11842,7 +11841,7 @@ action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Previously seen users in CloudTrail
-description = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last 30 days.
+description = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last 30 days. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication Datamodel
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-04-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-04-30
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities"]
@@ -11853,11 +11852,11 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 schedule_window = auto
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
-action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last 30 days.
-action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search.
+action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then creates a baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last 30 days. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication Datamodel
+action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search.
 disabled = true
 is_visible = false
-search = `cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | iplocation src | eval City=if(City LIKE "",src,City),Region=if(Region LIKE "",src,Region) | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats count
+search = `cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | iplocation src | eval City=if(City LIKE "",src,City),Region=if(Region LIKE "",src,Region) | stats earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats count
 
 [ESCU - Systems Ready for Spectre-Meltdown Windows Patch]
 action.escu = 0
@@ -11886,7 +11885,7 @@ action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = support
 action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Update previously seen users in CloudTrail
-description = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last hour.
+description = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last hour. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication Datamodel
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-04-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-04-30
 action.escu.analytic_story = ["Suspicious AWS Login Activities"]
@@ -11897,11 +11896,11 @@ dispatch.earliest_time = -70m@m
 dispatch.latest_time = -10m@m
 schedule_window = auto
 action.escu.providing_technologies = []
-action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last hour.
-action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search.
+action.escu.eli5 = This search looks for CloudTrail events where a user logs into the console, then updates the baseline of the latest and earliest times, City, Region, and Country we have encountered this user in our dataset, grouped by ARN, within the last hour. NOTE - This baseline search is deprecated and has been updated to use the Authentication Datamodel
+action.escu.how_to_implement = You must install the AWS App for Splunk (version 5.1.0 or later) and Splunk Add-on for AWS (version 4.4.0 or later), then configure your CloudTrail inputs. Please validate the user name entries in `previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail`, which is a lookup file created as a result of running this support search.
 disabled = true
 is_visible = false
-search = `cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | iplocation src | eval City=if(City LIKE "",src,City),Region=if(Region LIKE "",src,Region) | stats earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime by user src City Region Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins
+search = `cloudtrail` eventName=ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.arn as user | iplocation src | eval City=if(City LIKE "",src,City),Region=if(Region LIKE "",src,Region) | stats earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime by user src City Region Country | inputlookup append=t previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail | stats min(firstTime) as firstTime max(lastTime) as lastTime by user src City Region Country | outputlookup previously_seen_users_console_logins_cloudtrail
 
 [ESCU - Windows Updates Install Failures]
 action.escu = 0
@@ -11955,7 +11954,7 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` dc(Updates.dest) as count FRO
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest - Response Task
 description = This search retrieves the all the alerts created by AWS Security Hub for a specific dest(instance_id).
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-06-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-06-08
@@ -11976,7 +11975,7 @@ search = sourcetype="aws:securityhub:firehose" "findings{}.Resources{}.Type"=AWS
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN - Response Task
 description = This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specific user ARN and will create a table containing the source of the user, the region of the activity, the name and type of the event, the action taken, and all the user's identity information.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-04-30
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-04-30
@@ -11997,7 +11996,7 @@ search = | search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | search user=$user$| table _time us
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId - Response Task
 description = This search retrieves the times, ARN, source IPs, AWS regions, event names, and the result of the event for specific credentials.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-06-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-06-08
@@ -12018,7 +12017,7 @@ search = | search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | rename userIdentity.accessKeyId as
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Network ACL Details from ID - Response Task
 description = This search queries AWS description logs and returns all the information about a specific network ACL via network ACL ID
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-01-22
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-01-22
@@ -12039,7 +12038,7 @@ search = | search sourcetype=aws:description| rename id as networkAclId | search
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId - Response Task
 description = This search queries AWS configuration logs and returns the information about a specific network interface via network interface ID. The information will include the ARN of the network interface, its relationships with other AWS resources, the public and the private IP associated with the network interface.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-05-07
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-05-07
@@ -12060,7 +12059,7 @@ search = | search sourcetype=aws:config resourceId=$resourceId$ | table _time AR
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName - Response Task
 description = This search queries AWS configuration logs and returns the information about a specific S3 bucket. The information returned includes the time the S3 bucket was created, the resource ID, the region it belongs to, the value of action performed, AWS account ID, and configuration values of the access-control lists associated with the bucket.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-06-26
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-06-26
@@ -12081,7 +12080,7 @@ search = | search sourcetype=aws:config | rename resourceId as bucketName |searc
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - All backup logs for host
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - All backup logs for host - Response Task
 description = Retrieve the backup logs for the last 2 weeks for a specific host in order to investigate why backups are not completing successfully.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-12
@@ -12102,7 +12101,7 @@ search = | search sourcetype="netbackup_logs" dest=$dest$
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task
 description = This search provides investigation data about requests via user agent, authentication request URI, verb and cluster name data against Kubernetes cluster from a specific IP address
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-04-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-04-13
@@ -12123,7 +12122,7 @@ search = sourcetype="aws:cloudwatchlogs:eks" |rename sourceIPs{} as src_ip |sear
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip - Response Task
 description = This search provides investigation data about requests via user agent, authentication request URI, resource path and cluster name data against Kubernetes cluster from a specific IP address
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-04-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-04-13
@@ -12144,7 +12143,7 @@ search = sourcetype="google:gcp:pubsub:message" | rename data.protoPayload.reque
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From City - Response Task
 description = This search retrieves all the activity from a specific city and will create a table containing the time, city, ARN, username, the type of user, the source IP address, the AWS region the activity was in, the API called, and whether or not the API call was successful.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-19
@@ -12165,7 +12164,7 @@ search = | search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | iplocation sourceIPAddress | searc
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Country - Response Task
 description = This search retrieves all the activity from a specific country and will create a table containing the time, country, ARN, username, the type of user, the source IP address, the AWS region the activity was in, the API called, and whether or not the API call was successful.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-19
@@ -12186,7 +12185,7 @@ search = | search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | iplocation sourceIPAddress | searc
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address - Response Task
 description = This search retrieves all the activity from a specific IP address and will create a table containing the time, ARN, username, the type of user, the IP address, the AWS region the activity was in, the API called, and whether or not the API call was successful.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-19
@@ -12207,7 +12206,7 @@ search = | search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | iplocation sourceIPAddress | searc
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get All AWS Activity From Region - Response Task
 description = This search retrieves all the activity from a specific geographic region and will create a table containing the time, geographic region, ARN, username, the type of user, the source IP address, the AWS region the activity was in, the API called, and whether or not the API call was successful.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-19
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-19
@@ -12228,7 +12227,7 @@ search = | search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail | iplocation sourceIPAddress | searc
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task
 description = This search will tell you the backup status from your netbackup_logs of a specific endpoint for the last week.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-14
@@ -12249,7 +12248,7 @@ search = | search sourcetype="netbackup_logs" COMPUTERNAME=$dest$ | rename COMPU
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Certificate logs for a domain
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Certificate logs for a domain - Response Task
 description = This search queries the Certificates datamodel and give you all the information for a specific domain. Please note that the certificates issued by "Let's Encrypt" are widely used by attackers.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-04-29
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-04-29
@@ -12270,7 +12269,7 @@ search = | tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as la
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get DNS Server History for a host - Response Task
 description = While investigating any detections it is important to understand which and how many DNS servers a host has connected to in the past. This search uses data that is tagged as DNS and gives you a count and list of DNS servers that a particular host has connected to the previous 24 hours.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-11-09
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-11-09
@@ -12291,7 +12290,7 @@ search = | search tag=dns src_ip=$src_ip$ dest_port=53 | streamstats time_window
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get DNS traffic ratio - Response Task
 description = This search calculates the ratio of DNS traffic originating and coming from a host to a list of DNS servers over the last 24 hours. A high value of this ratio could be very useful to quickly understand if a src_ip (host) is sending a high volume of data out via port 53, could be an indicator of data exfiltration via DNS.  
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-11-09
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-11-09
@@ -12312,7 +12311,7 @@ search = | tstats allow_old_summaries=true sum(All_Traffic.bytes_out) as "bytes_
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId - Response Task
 description = This search queries AWS description logs and returns all the information about a specific instance via the instanceId field
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-02-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-02-12
@@ -12333,7 +12332,7 @@ search = | search sourcetype="aws:description" source="*:ec2_instances"| dedup i
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get EC2 Launch Details - Response Task
 description = This search returns some of the launch details for a EC2 instance.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-12
@@ -12354,7 +12353,7 @@ search = | search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail dest=$dest$ |rename userIdentity.arn
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Email Info
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Email Info - Response Task
 description = This search returns all the information Splunk might have collected a specific email message over the last 2 hours.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-11-09
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-11-09
@@ -12375,7 +12374,7 @@ search = | from datamodel Email.All_Email | search message_id=$message_id$
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Emails From Specific Sender - Response Task
 description = This search returns all the emails from a specific sender over the last 24 and next hours.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-11-09
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-11-09
@@ -12396,7 +12395,7 @@ search = | from datamodel Email.All_Email | search src_user=$src_user$
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address - Response Task
 description = This search allows you to gather more context around a notable which has detected a new device connecting to your network. Use this search to determine the first and last occurrences of the suspicious device attempting to connect with your network.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-13
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-13
@@ -12417,7 +12416,7 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task
 description = This search returns a list of all email sources seen in the 48 hours prior to the notable event to 24 hours after, and the number of emails from each source.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-02-21
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-02-21
@@ -12438,7 +12437,7 @@ search = |tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(All_Email.dest) as dest
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For Endpoint
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For Endpoint - Response Task
 description = This search allows you to retrieve any modifications to logon rights associated with a specific host.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-12
@@ -12459,7 +12458,7 @@ search = | search eventtype=wineventlog_security (signature_id=4718 OR signature
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For User
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Logon Rights Modifications For User - Response Task
 description = This search allows you to retrieve any modifications to logon rights for a specific user account.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-02-27
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-02-27
@@ -12480,7 +12479,7 @@ search = | search eventtype=wineventlog_security (signature_id=4718 OR signature
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Notable History
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task
 description = This search queries the notable index and returns all the Notable Events for the particular destination host, giving the analyst an overview of the incidents that may have occurred with the host under investigation.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-09-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-09-20
@@ -12501,7 +12500,7 @@ search = | search `notable` | search dest=$dest$ | table _time, dest, rule_name,
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Outbound Emails to Hidden Cobra Threat Actors - Response Task
 description = This search returns the information of the users that sent emails to the accounts controlled by the Hidden Cobra Threat Actors: specifically to `misswang8107@gmail.com`, and from `redhat@gmail.com`.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-06-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-06-14
@@ -12522,7 +12521,7 @@ search = | from datamodel Email.All_Email | search recipient=misswang8107@gmail.
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Parent Process Info
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task
 description = This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the parent process of a process running on a host which is under investigation. Enter the values of the process name in question and the dest
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-02-28
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-02-28
@@ -12543,7 +12542,7 @@ search = | tstats `summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Process File Activity
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Process File Activity - Response Task
 description = This search returns the file activity for a specific process on a specific endpoint
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-11-06
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-11-06
@@ -12564,7 +12563,7 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Filesystem.file_name)
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Process Info
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task
 description = This search queries the Endpoint data model to give you details about the process running on a host which is under investigation. To gather the process info, enter the values for the process name in question and the destination IP address.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-04-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-04-01
@@ -12585,7 +12584,7 @@ search = | tstats `summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task
 description = This search will return information about the process associated with observed network traffic to a specific destination port from a specific host.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-04-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-04-01
@@ -12606,7 +12605,7 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) max(_time) a
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic - Response Task
 description = While investigating, an analyst will want to know what process and parent_process is responsible for generating suspicious DNS traffic. Use the following search and enter the value of `dest` in the search to get specific details on the process responsible for creating the DNS traffic.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-04-01
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-04-01
@@ -12627,7 +12626,7 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) max(_time) a
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task
 description = This search queries Sysmon WMI events for the host of interest.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-10-23
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-10-23
@@ -12648,7 +12647,7 @@ search = sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventC
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Get Web Session Information via session id - Response Task
 description = This search helps an analyst investigate a notable event to find out more about a specific web session. The search looks for a specific web session ID in the HTTP web traffic and outputs the URL and user agents, grouped by source IP address and HTTP status code.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-10-08
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-10-08
@@ -12669,7 +12668,7 @@ search = | search sourcetype=stream:http session_id  = $session_id$ | stats valu
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field - Response Task
 description = This search lists all the logged CloudTrail activities by a specific user and will create a table containing the source of the user, the region of the activity, the name and type of the event, the action taken, and the user's identity information.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-03-12
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-03-12
@@ -12690,7 +12689,7 @@ search = | search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail user=$user$ | table _time userIdenti
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate AWS activities via region name - Response Task
 description = This search lists all the user activities logged by CloudTrail for a specific region in question and will create a table of the values of parameters requested, the type of the event and the response from the AWS API by each user
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-02-09
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-02-09
@@ -12711,7 +12710,7 @@ search = | search sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail vendor_region=$vendor_region$| renam
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations - Response Task
 description = This search returns failed logins to multiple destinations by user.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-12-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-12-10
@@ -12732,7 +12731,7 @@ search = | tstats count `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as firs
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip - Response Task
 description = This search allows you to find all the network traffic from a specific IP address.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-06-15
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-06-15
@@ -12753,7 +12752,7 @@ search = | from datamodel Network_Traffic.All_Traffic | search src_ip=$src_ip$
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address - Response Task
 description = This search returns all okta events from a specific IP address.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-04-02
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-04-02
@@ -12774,7 +12773,7 @@ search = eventtype=okta_log src_ip={src_ip} | rename client.geographicalContext.
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Okta Activity by app - Response Task
 description = This search returns all okta events associated with a specific app
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-04-02
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-04-02
@@ -12795,7 +12794,7 @@ search = eventtype=okta_log app=$app$ | rename client.geographicalContext.countr
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts - Response Task
 description = This search hunts for dumped NTLM hashes used for pass the hash.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-12-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-12-10
@@ -12816,7 +12815,7 @@ search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=9 AuthenticationPackag
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts - Response Task
 description = This search hunts for dumped kerberos ticket from LSASS memory.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-12-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-12-10
@@ -12837,7 +12836,7 @@ search = `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 OR EventCode=4769 | rex field=use
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Previous Unseen User - Response Task
 description = This search returns previous unseen user, which didn't log in for 30 days.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2019-12-10
 action.escu.modification_date = 2019-12-10
@@ -12858,7 +12857,7 @@ search = | tstats count `security_content_summariesonly` earliest(_time) as firs
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications - Response Task
 description = This search returns the source, destination, and user for all successful remote-desktop authentications. A successful authentication after a brute-force attack on a destination machine is suspicious behavior. 
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-12-14
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-12-14
@@ -12879,7 +12878,7 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Suspicious Strings in HTTP Header - Response Task
 description = This search helps an analyst investigate a notable event related to a potential Apache Struts exploitation. To investigate, we will want to isolate and analyze the "payload" or the commands that were passed to the vulnerable hosts by creating a few regular expressions to carve out the commands focusing on common keywords from the payload, such as cmd.exe, /bin/bash and whois. The search returns these suspicious strings found in the HTTP logs of the system of interest.
 action.escu.creation_date = 2017-10-20
 action.escu.modification_date = 2017-10-20
@@ -12900,7 +12899,7 @@ search = | search sourcetype=stream:http | search src_ip=$src_ip$ | search dest_
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate User Activities In Okta - Response Task
 description = This search returns all okta events by a specific user
 action.escu.creation_date = 2020-04-02
 action.escu.modification_date = 2020-04-02
@@ -12921,7 +12920,7 @@ search = eventtype=okta_log user=$user$ | rename client.geographicalContext.coun
 action.escu = 0
 action.escu.enabled = 1
 action.escu.search_type = investigative
-action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src
+action.escu.full_search_name = ESCU - Investigate Web POSTs From src - Response Task
 description = This investigative search retrieves POST requests from a specified source IP or hostname. Identifying the POST requests, as well as their associated destination URLs and user agent(s), may help you scope and characterize the suspicious traffic. 
 action.escu.creation_date = 2018-12-06
 action.escu.modification_date = 2018-12-06

package/default/transforms.conf

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #############
 # Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security-content
-# On Date: 2021-01-19T18:16:45 UTC
+# On Date: 2021-01-27T01:41:05 UTC
 # Author: Splunk Security Research
 # Contact: research@splunk.com
 #############
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ min_matches = 1
 
 [domains]
 filename = domains.csv
-# description = A list of domains that can be whitelisted
+# description = A list of domains that can be ignored
 
 [dynamic_dns_providers_default]
 filename = dynamic_dns_providers_default.csv
@@ -78,18 +78,18 @@ min_matches = 1
 
 [legit_domains]
 filename = legit_domains.csv
-# description = A list of legit domains to be used to whitelist possible phishing sites
+# description = A list of legit domains to be used as an ignore list for possible phishing sites
 
-[lookup_rare_process_whitelist_default]
-filename = rare_process_whitelist_default.csv
+[lookup_rare_process_allow_list_default]
+filename = rare_process_allow_list_default.csv
 default_match = false
 case_sensitive_match = false
-# description = A list of rare processes that are legitimate provided by Splunk
+# description = A list of rare processes that are legitimate that is provided by Splunk
 match_type = WILDCARD(process)
 min_matches = 1
 
-[lookup_rare_process_whitelist_local]
-filename = rare_process_whitelist_local.csv
+[lookup_rare_process_allow_list_local]
+filename = rare_process_allow_list_local.csv
 default_match = false
 case_sensitive_match = false
 # description = A list of rare processes that are legitimate provided by the end user
@@ -208,6 +208,7 @@ filename = prohibited_softwares.csv
 [ransomware_extensions_lookup]
 filename = ransomware_extensions.csv
 default_match = false
+case_sensitive_match = false
 # description = A list of file extensions that are associated with ransomware
 min_matches = 1
 

package/default/workflow_actions.conf

@@ -1,227 +1,227 @@
 
-[workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest]
+[workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task]
 label                   = Workbench - AWS Investigate Security Hub alerts by dest
 type                    = link
 fields                  = dest
 display_location        = field_menu
-link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
+link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_aws_investigate_security_hub_alerts_by_dest___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
 link.target             = blank
 link.method             = get
 
-[workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn]
+[workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task]
 label                   = Workbench - AWS Investigate User Activities By ARN
 type                    = link
 fields                  = user
 display_location        = field_menu
-link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_identity=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
+link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_identity=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_arn___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
 link.target             = blank
 link.method             = get
 
-[workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid]
+[workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid___response_task]
 label                   = Workbench - AWS Investigate User Activities By AccessKeyId
 type                    = link
 fields                  = accessKeyId
 display_location        = field_menu
-link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
+link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_aws_investigate_user_activities_by_accesskeyid___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
 link.target             = blank
 link.method             = get
 
-[workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id]
+[workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task]
 label                   = Workbench - AWS Network ACL Details from ID
 type                    = link
 fields                  = networkAclId
 display_location        = field_menu
-link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
+link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_aws_network_acl_details_from_id___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
 link.target             = blank
 link.method             = get
 
-[workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid]
+[workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task]
 label                   = Workbench - AWS Network Interface details via resourceId
 type                    = link
 fields                  = resourceId
 display_location        = field_menu
-link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
+link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_aws_network_interface_details_via_resourceid___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
 link.target             = blank
 link.method             = get
 
-[workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname]
+[workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname___response_task]
 label                   = Workbench - AWS S3 Bucket details via bucketName
 type                    = link
 fields                  = bucketName
 display_location        = field_menu
-link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
+link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_aws_s3_bucket_details_via_bucketname___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
 link.target             = blank
 link.method             = get
 
-[workbench_panel_all_backup_logs_for_host]
+[workbench_panel_all_backup_logs_for_host___response_task]
 label                   = Workbench - All backup logs for host
 type                    = link
 fields                  = dest
 display_location        = field_menu
-link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_all_backup_logs_for_host&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
+link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_all_backup_logs_for_host___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
 link.target             = blank
 link.method             = get
 
-[workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip]
+[workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task]
 label                   = Workbench - Amazon EKS Kubernetes activity by src ip
 type                    = link
 fields                  = src_ip
 display_location        = field_menu
-link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
+link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_amazon_eks_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
 link.target             = blank
 link.method             = get
 
-[workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip]
+[workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task]
 label                   = Workbench - GCP Kubernetes activity by src ip
 type                    = link
 fields                  = src_ip
 display_location        = field_menu
-link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
+link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_gcp_kubernetes_activity_by_src_ip___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
 link.target             = blank
 link.method             = get
 
-[workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city]
+[workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city___response_task]
 label                   = Workbench - Get All AWS Activity From City
 type                    = link
 fields                  = City
 display_location        = field_menu
-link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
+link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_city___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
 link.target             = blank
 link.method             = get
 
-[workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country]
+[workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country___response_task]
 label                   = Workbench - Get All AWS Activity From Country
 type                    = link
 fields                  = Country
 display_location        = field_menu
-link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
+link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_country___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
 link.target             = blank
 link.method             = get
 
-[workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address]
+[workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task]
 label                   = Workbench - Get All AWS Activity From IP Address
 type                    = link
 fields                  = src_ip
 display_location        = field_menu
-link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
+link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_ip_address___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
 link.target             = blank
 link.method             = get
 
-[workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_region]
+[workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_region___response_task]
 label                   = Workbench - Get All AWS Activity From Region
 type                    = link
 fields                  = Region
 display_location        = field_menu
-link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_region&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
+link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_all_aws_activity_from_region___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
 link.target             = blank
 link.method             = get
 
-[workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint]
+[workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task]
 label                   = Workbench - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint
 type                    = link
 fields                  = dest
 display_location        = field_menu
-link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
+link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_backup_logs_for_endpoint___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
 link.target             = blank
 link.method             = get
 
-[workbench_panel_get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain]
+[workbench_panel_get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain___response_task]
 label                   = Workbench - Get Certificate logs for a domain
 type                    = link
 fields                  = domain
 display_location        = field_menu
-link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
+link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_certificate_logs_for_a_domain___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
 link.target             = blank
 link.method             = get
 
-[workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host]
+[workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task]
 label                   = Workbench - Get DNS Server History for a host
 type                    = link
 fields                  = src_ip
 display_location        = field_menu
-link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
+link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_dns_server_history_for_a_host___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
 link.target             = blank
 link.method             = get
 
 
-[workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid]
+[workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task]
 label                   = Workbench - Get EC2 Instance Details by instanceId
 type                    = link
 fields                  = instanceId
 display_location        = field_menu
-link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
+link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_ec2_instance_details_by_instanceid___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
 link.target             = blank
 link.method             = get
 
-[workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details]
+[workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task]
 label                   = Workbench - Get EC2 Launch Details
 type                    = link
 fields                  = dest
 display_location        = field_menu
-link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
+link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_ec2_launch_details___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
 link.target             = blank
 link.method             = get
 
-[workbench_panel_get_email_info]
+[workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task]
 label                   = Workbench - Get Email Info
 type                    = link
 fields                  = message_id
 display_location        = field_menu
-link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_email_info&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
+link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_email_info___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
 link.target             = blank
 link.method             = get
 
-[workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender]
+[workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task]
 label                   = Workbench - Get Emails From Specific Sender
 type                    = link
 fields                  = src_user
 display_location        = field_menu
-link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
+link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_emails_from_specific_sender___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
 link.target             = blank
 link.method             = get
 
-[workbench_panel_get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address]
+[workbench_panel_get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address___response_task]
 label                   = Workbench - Get First Occurrence and Last Occurrence of a MAC Address
 type                    = link
 fields                  = src_mac
 display_location        = field_menu
-link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
+link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_first_occurrence_and_last_occurrence_of_a_mac_address___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
 link.target             = blank
 link.method             = get
 
-[workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources]
+[workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task]
 label                   = Workbench - Get History Of Email Sources
 type                    = link
 fields                  = src
 display_location        = field_menu
-link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
+link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_history_of_email_sources___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
 link.target             = blank
 link.method             = get
 
-[workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint]
+[workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint___response_task]
 label                   = Workbench - Get Logon Rights Modifications For Endpoint
 type                    = link
 fields                  = dest
 display_location        = field_menu
-link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
+link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_endpoint___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
 link.target             = blank
 link.method             = get
 
-[workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user]
+[workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user___response_task]
 label                   = Workbench - Get Logon Rights Modifications For User
 type                    = link
 fields                  = user
 display_location        = field_menu
-link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_identity=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
+link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_identity=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_logon_rights_modifications_for_user___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
 link.target             = blank
 link.method             = get
 
-[workbench_panel_get_notable_history]
+[workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task]
 label                   = Workbench - Get Notable History
 type                    = link
 fields                  = dest
 display_location        = field_menu
-link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_notable_history&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
+link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_notable_history___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
 link.target             = blank
 link.method             = get
 
@@ -230,131 +230,131 @@ link.method             = get
 
 
 
-[workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic]
+[workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task]
 label                   = Workbench - Get Process Responsible For The DNS Traffic
 type                    = link
 fields                  = dest
 display_location        = field_menu
-link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
+link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_process_responsible_for_the_dns_traffic___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
 link.target             = blank
 link.method             = get
 
 
-[workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id]
+[workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id___response_task]
 label                   = Workbench - Get Web Session Information via session id
 type                    = link
 fields                  = session_id
 display_location        = field_menu
-link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
+link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_get_web_session_information_via_session_id___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
 link.target             = blank
 link.method             = get
 
-[workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field]
+[workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field___response_task]
 label                   = Workbench - Investigate AWS User Activities by user field
 type                    = link
 fields                  = user
 display_location        = field_menu
-link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_identity=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
+link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_identity=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_aws_user_activities_by_user_field___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
 link.target             = blank
 link.method             = get
 
-[workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name]
+[workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task]
 label                   = Workbench - Investigate AWS activities via region name
 type                    = link
 fields                  = vendor_region
 display_location        = field_menu
-link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
+link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_aws_activities_via_region_name___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
 link.target             = blank
 link.method             = get
 
-[workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations]
+[workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations___response_task]
 label                   = Workbench - Investigate Failed Logins for Multiple Destinations
 type                    = link
 fields                  = user
 display_location        = field_menu
-link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_identity=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
+link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_identity=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_failed_logins_for_multiple_destinations___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
 link.target             = blank
 link.method             = get
 
-[workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip]
+[workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip___response_task]
 label                   = Workbench - Investigate Network Traffic From src ip
 type                    = link
 fields                  = src_ip
 display_location        = field_menu
-link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
+link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_network_traffic_from_src_ip___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
 link.target             = blank
 link.method             = get
 
-[workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address]
+[workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address___response_task]
 label                   = Workbench - Investigate Okta Activity by IP Address
 type                    = link
 fields                  = user
 display_location        = field_menu
-link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_identity=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
+link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_identity=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_ip_address___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
 link.target             = blank
 link.method             = get
 
-[workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_app]
+[workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_app___response_task]
 label                   = Workbench - Investigate Okta Activity by app
 type                    = link
 fields                  = app
 display_location        = field_menu
-link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_app&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
+link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_okta_activity_by_app___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
 link.target             = blank
 link.method             = get
 
-[workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts]
+[workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts___response_task]
 label                   = Workbench - Investigate Pass the Hash Attempts
 type                    = link
 fields                  = dest
 display_location        = field_menu
-link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
+link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_hash_attempts___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
 link.target             = blank
 link.method             = get
 
-[workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts]
+[workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts___response_task]
 label                   = Workbench - Investigate Pass the Ticket Attempts
 type                    = link
 fields                  = dest
 display_location        = field_menu
-link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
+link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_pass_the_ticket_attempts___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
 link.target             = blank
 link.method             = get
 
-[workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user]
+[workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user___response_task]
 label                   = Workbench - Investigate Previous Unseen User
 type                    = link
 fields                  = dest
 display_location        = field_menu
-link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
+link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_previous_unseen_user___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
 link.target             = blank
 link.method             = get
 
-[workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications]
+[workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task]
 label                   = Workbench - Investigate Successful Remote Desktop Authentications
 type                    = link
 fields                  = dest
 display_location        = field_menu
-link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
+link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_successful_remote_desktop_authentications___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
 link.target             = blank
 link.method             = get
 
 
-[workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_okta]
+[workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_okta___response_task]
 label                   = Workbench - Investigate User Activities In Okta
 type                    = link
 fields                  = user
 display_location        = field_menu
-link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_identity=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_okta&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
+link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_identity=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_user_activities_in_okta___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
 link.target             = blank
 link.method             = get
 
-[workbench_panel_investigate_web_posts_from_src]
+[workbench_panel_investigate_web_posts_from_src___response_task]
 label                   = Workbench - Investigate Web POSTs From src
 type                    = link
 fields                  = src
 display_location        = field_menu
-link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_web_posts_from_src&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
+link.uri                = /app/$@namespace$/ess_workbench_panel?type_asset=$@field_value$&panel=workbench_panel_investigate_web_posts_from_src___response_task&drilldown_field=$@field_name$&use_drilldown_time=true
 link.target             = blank
 link.method             = get
 

package/lookups/mitre_enrichment.csv

@@ -1,5 +1,102 @@
 mitre_id,technique,tactics,groups
-T1205.001,Port Knocking,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,no
+T1059.008,Network Device CLI,Execution,no
+T1602.002,Network Device Configuration Dump,Collection,no
+T1542.005,TFTP Boot,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
+T1542.004,ROMMONkit,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
+T1602.001,SNMP (MIB Dump),Collection,no
+T1602,Data from Configuration Repository,Collection,no
+T1601.002,Downgrade System Image,Defense Evasion,no
+T1601.001,Patch System Image,Defense Evasion,no
+T1601,Modify System Image,Defense Evasion,no
+T1600.002,Disable Crypto Hardware,Defense Evasion,no
+T1600.001,Reduce Key Space,Defense Evasion,no
+T1600,Weaken Encryption,Defense Evasion,no
+T1556.004,Network Device Authentication,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no
+T1599.001,Network Address Translation Traversal,Defense Evasion,no
+T1599,Network Boundary Bridging,Defense Evasion,no
+T1020.001,Traffic Duplication,Exfiltration,no
+T1557.002,ARP Cache Poisoning,Credential Access|Collection,Cleaver
+T1588.006,Vulnerabilities,Resource Development,no
+T1053.006,Systemd Timers,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
+T1562.008,Disable Cloud Logs,Defense Evasion,no
+T1547.012,Print Processors,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
+T1598.003,Spearphishing Link,Reconnaissance,no
+T1598.002,Spearphishing Attachment,Reconnaissance,no
+T1598.001,Spearphishing Service,Reconnaissance,no
+T1598,Phishing for Information,Reconnaissance,no
+T1597.002,Purchase Technical Data,Reconnaissance,no
+T1597.001,Threat Intel Vendors,Reconnaissance,no
+T1597,Search Closed Sources,Reconnaissance,no
+T1596.005,Scan Databases,Reconnaissance,no
+T1596.004,CDNs,Reconnaissance,no
+T1596.003,Digital Certificates,Reconnaissance,no
+T1596.001,DNS/Passive DNS,Reconnaissance,no
+T1596.002,WHOIS,Reconnaissance,no
+T1596,Search Open Technical Databases,Reconnaissance,no
+T1595.002,Vulnerability Scanning,Reconnaissance,no
+T1595.001,Scanning IP Blocks,Reconnaissance,no
+T1595,Active Scanning,Reconnaissance,no
+T1594,Search Victim-Owned Websites,Reconnaissance,no
+T1593.002,Search Engines,Reconnaissance,no
+T1593.001,Social Media,Reconnaissance,no
+T1593,Search Open Websites/Domains,Reconnaissance,no
+T1592.004,Client Configurations,Reconnaissance,no
+T1592.003,Firmware,Reconnaissance,no
+T1592.002,Software,Reconnaissance,no
+T1592.001,Hardware,Reconnaissance,no
+T1592,Gather Victim Host Information,Reconnaissance,no
+T1591.004,Identify Roles,Reconnaissance,no
+T1591.003,Identify Business Tempo,Reconnaissance,no
+T1591.001,Determine Physical Locations,Reconnaissance,no
+T1591.002,Business Relationships,Reconnaissance,no
+T1591,Gather Victim Org Information,Reconnaissance,no
+T1590.006,Network Security Appliances,Reconnaissance,no
+T1590.005,IP Addresses,Reconnaissance,no
+T1590.004,Network Topology,Reconnaissance,no
+T1590.003,Network Trust Dependencies,Reconnaissance,no
+T1590.002,DNS,Reconnaissance,no
+T1590.001,Domain Properties,Reconnaissance,no
+T1590,Gather Victim Network Information,Reconnaissance,no
+T1589.003,Employee Names,Reconnaissance,no
+T1589.002,Email Addresses,Reconnaissance,no
+T1589.001,Credentials,Reconnaissance,no
+T1589,Gather Victim Identity Information,Reconnaissance,no
+T1588.005,Exploits,Resource Development,no
+T1588.004,Digital Certificates,Resource Development,no
+T1588.003,Code Signing Certificates,Resource Development,Wizard Spider
+T1588.002,Tool,Resource Development,no
+T1588.001,Malware,Resource Development,Turla|APT1
+T1588,Obtain Capabilities,Resource Development,no
+T1587.004,Exploits,Resource Development,no
+T1587.003,Digital Certificates,Resource Development,APT29|PROMETHIUM
+T1587.002,Code Signing Certificates,Resource Development,PROMETHIUM|Patchwork
+T1587.001,Malware,Resource Development,Turla|FIN7|Night Dragon|Cleaver
+T1587,Develop Capabilities,Resource Development,no
+T1586.002,Email Accounts,Resource Development,no
+T1586.001,Social Media Accounts,Resource Development,no
+T1586,Compromise Accounts,Resource Development,no
+T1585.002,Email Accounts,Resource Development,APT1
+T1585.001,Social Media Accounts,Resource Development,Cleaver
+T1585,Establish Accounts,Resource Development,APT17
+T1584.006,Web Services,Resource Development,Turla
+T1584.005,Botnet,Resource Development,no
+T1584.004,Server,Resource Development,Turla|APT16
+T1584.003,Virtual Private Server,Resource Development,Turla
+T1584.002,DNS Server,Resource Development,no
+T1584.001,Domains,Resource Development,APT1
+T1583.006,Web Services,Resource Development,APT17|APT29
+T1583.005,Botnet,Resource Development,no
+T1583.004,Server,Resource Development,no
+T1583.003,Virtual Private Server,Resource Development,TEMP.Veles
+T1583.002,DNS Server,Resource Development,no
+T1584,Compromise Infrastructure,Resource Development,no
+T1583.001,Domains,Resource Development,APT1|APT28
+T1583,Acquire Infrastructure,Resource Development,no
+T1564.007,VBA Stomping,Defense Evasion,no
+T1558.004,AS-REP Roasting,Credential Access,no
+T1580,Cloud Infrastructure Discovery,Discovery,no
+T1218.012,Verclsid,Defense Evasion,no
+T1205.001,Port Knocking,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,PROMETHIUM
 T1564.006,Run Virtual Instance,Defense Evasion,no
 T1564.005,Hidden File System,Defense Evasion,Strider|Equation
 T1556.003,Pluggable Authentication Modules,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no
@@ -7,7 +104,7 @@ T1574.012,COR_PROFILER,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Blue Moc
 T1562.007,Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall,Defense Evasion,no
 T1098.004,SSH Authorized Keys,Persistence,no
 T1480.001,Environmental Keying,Defense Evasion,APT41|Equation
-T1059.007,JavaScript/JScript,Execution,APT32|FIN7|Cobalt Group|Molerats|TA505|Silence|Leafminer
+T1059.007,JavaScript/JScript,Execution,FIN6|APT32|FIN7|Cobalt Group|Molerats|TA505|Silence|Leafminer
 T1578.004,Revert Cloud Instance,Defense Evasion,no
 T1578.003,Delete Cloud Instance,Defense Evasion,no
 T1578.001,Create Snapshot,Defense Evasion,no
@@ -24,13 +121,13 @@ T1546.015,Component Object Model Hijacking,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT2
 T1071.004,DNS,Command And Control,APT39|Tropic Trooper|OilRig|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|APT18|APT41|FIN7
 T1071.003,Mail Protocols,Command And Control,APT32|SilverTerrier|APT28
 T1071.002,File Transfer Protocols,Command And Control,APT41|SilverTerrier|Machete|Honeybee
-T1071.001,Web Protocols,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|Machete|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Cobalt Group|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Rancor|Orangeworm|APT37|Ke3chang|Dark Caracal|Turla|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|OilRig|Magic Hound|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon
+T1071.001,Web Protocols,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|Machete|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Threat Group-3390|Cobalt Group|APT37|Turla|APT19|Rancor|Orangeworm|Dark Caracal|Ke3chang|Lazarus Group|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|Magic Hound|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon
 T1572,Protocol Tunneling,Command And Control,OilRig|Cobalt Group|FIN6
-T1048.003,Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,APT32|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group
+T1048.003,Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,Wizard Spider|FIN6|APT32|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group
 T1048.002,Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,no
 T1048.001,Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,no
 T1001.003,Protocol Impersonation,Command And Control,Lazarus Group
-T1001.002,Steganography,Command And Control,Axiom
+T1001.002,Steganography,Command And Control,APT29|Axiom
 T1001.001,Junk Data,Command And Control,APT28
 T1132.002,Non-Standard Encoding,Command And Control,no
 T1132.001,Standard Encoding,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT33|APT19|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork
@@ -39,20 +136,20 @@ T1090.003,Multi-hop Proxy,Command And Control,Inception|FIN4|APT29
 T1090.002,External Proxy,Command And Control,APT39|Silence|Soft Cell|MuddyWater|APT3|FIN5|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT28
 T1090.001,Internal Proxy,Command And Control,APT39|Strider
 T1102.003,One-Way Communication,Command And Control,Leviathan
-T1102.002,Bidirectional Communication,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|Turla|FIN7|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak
+T1102.002,Bidirectional Communication,Command And Control,APT29|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|Turla|FIN7|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak
 T1102.001,Dead Drop Resolver,Command And Control,Rocke|APT41|BRONZE BUTLER|RTM|Patchwork
 T1571,Non-Standard Port,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Rocke|DarkVishnya|Silence|APT-C-36|Magic Hound|APT33|APT32|TEMP.Veles|Lazarus Group|FIN7
 T1074.002,Remote Data Staging,Collection,Threat Group-3390|menuPass|FIN6|Night Dragon|FIN8
-T1074.001,Local Data Staging,Collection,Machete|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|menuPass|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
+T1074.001,Local Data Staging,Collection,Machete|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|Honeybee|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|FIN5|APT3|menuPass|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
 T1078.004,Cloud Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,APT33
 T1564.004,NTFS File Attributes,Defense Evasion,APT32
 T1564.003,Hidden Window,Defense Evasion,Gorgon Group|Deep Panda|DarkHydrus|CopyKittens|APT19|APT32|APT28|APT3|Magic Hound
-T1078.003,Local Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Tropic Trooper|FIN10|Stolen Pencil|APT32
-T1078.002,Domain Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,TA505|APT3|Threat Group-1314
+T1078.003,Local Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,PROMETHIUM|Tropic Trooper|FIN10|Stolen Pencil|APT32
+T1078.002,Domain Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Wizard Spider|APT29|TA505|APT3|Threat Group-1314
 T1078.001,Default Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,no
 T1564.002,Hidden Users,Defense Evasion,no
 T1574.006,LD_PRELOAD,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Rocke
-T1574.002,DLL Side-Loading,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|Naikon|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|Patchwork|APT19|APT32|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390
+T1574.002,DLL Side-Loading,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|Naikon|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|APT19|Patchwork|APT32|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390
 T1574.001,DLL Search Order Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Whitefly|RTM|Threat Group-3390|menuPass
 T1574.008,Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
 T1574.007,Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
@@ -64,14 +161,14 @@ T1574,Hijack Execution Flow,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
 T1069.001,Local Groups,Discovery,Turla|OilRig|admin@338
 T1570,Lateral Tool Transfer,Lateral Movement,APT32|Wizard Spider|Turla|FIN10
 T1568.003,DNS Calculation,Command And Control,APT12
-T1204.002,Malicious File,Execution,Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|DarkHydrus|Gorgon Group|Patchwork|OilRig|Dark Caracal|MuddyWater|Lazarus Group|FIN7|APT32|Rancor|APT37|FIN8|APT28|Elderwood|TA459|APT29|Leviathan|menuPass|PLATINUM
-T1204.001,Malicious Link,Execution,Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|APT33|Turla
+T1204.002,Malicious File,Execution,FIN6|PROMETHIUM|APT30|Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Cobalt Group|BRONZE BUTLER|DarkHydrus|APT32|Dark Caracal|FIN7|Gorgon Group|OilRig|MuddyWater|Lazarus Group|Patchwork|Rancor|TA459|APT28|FIN8|APT37|APT29|menuPass|Elderwood|Leviathan|PLATINUM
+T1204.001,Malicious Link,Execution,Wizard Spider|Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|APT33|Turla
 T1195.003,Compromise Hardware Supply Chain,Initial Access,no
-T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,Initial Access,Sandworm Team|APT41
+T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,Initial Access,GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly|Sandworm Team|APT41
 T1195.001,Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools,Initial Access,no
-T1568.001,Fast Flux DNS,Command And Control,TA505
+T1568.001,Fast Flux DNS,Command And Control,Machete|TA505
 T1052.001,Exfiltration over USB,Exfiltration,Tropic Trooper
-T1569.002,Service Execution,Execution,Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT41|Silence|FIN6|APT32|Honeybee|Ke3chang
+T1569.002,Service Execution,Execution,Wizard Spider|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT41|Silence|FIN6|APT32|Honeybee|Ke3chang
 T1569.001,Launchctl,Execution,no
 T1569,System Services,Execution,no
 T1568.002,Domain Generation Algorithms,Command And Control,APT41
@@ -79,22 +176,22 @@ T1568,Dynamic Resolution,Command And Control,no
 T1011.001,Exfiltration Over Bluetooth,Exfiltration,no
 T1567.002,Exfiltration to Cloud Storage,Exfiltration,Leviathan|Turla
 T1567.001,Exfiltration to Code Repository,Exfiltration,no
-T1059.006,Python,Execution,Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete
-T1059.005,Visual Basic,Execution,APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|TA459|Magic Hound
+T1059.006,Python,Execution,APT29|Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete
+T1059.005,Visual Basic,Execution,Lazarus Group|APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|TA459|Leviathan|Magic Hound
 T1059.004,Unix Shell,Execution,Rocke|APT41
-T1059.003,Windows Command Shell,Execution,TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Silence|APT32|APT39|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Dark Caracal|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Rancor|Ke3chang|APT37|Leviathan|FIN8|APT28|Magic Hound|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Gamaredon Group|Suckfly|Patchwork|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1
+T1059.003,Windows Command Shell,Execution,Wizard Spider|FIN6|TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Silence|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Gorgon Group|Dark Caracal|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|Rancor|APT37|Leviathan|FIN8|APT28|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|FIN10|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Suckfly|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1
 T1059.002,AppleScript,Execution,no
-T1059.001,PowerShell,Execution,Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|APT19|DarkHydrus|APT28|Thrip|Gorgon Group|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|TA459|FIN8|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|APT32|FIN7|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda
+T1059.001,PowerShell,Execution,Lazarus Group|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|Gorgon Group|APT19|DarkHydrus|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Leviathan|TA459|MuddyWater|FIN8|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|OilRig|FIN10|APT32|FIN7|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda
 T1567,Exfiltration Over Web Service,Exfiltration,no
 T1497.003,Time Based Evasion,Defense Evasion|Discovery,no
 T1497.002,User Activity Based Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,FIN7
 T1497.001,System Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,Frankenstein
 T1498.002,Reflection Amplification,Impact,no
 T1498.001,Direct Network Flood,Impact,no
-T1566.003,Spearphishing via Service,Initial Access,Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal
-T1566.002,Spearphishing Link,Initial Access,Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|Turla|APT28|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|APT33|Elderwood|Leviathan|Magic Hound|Patchwork|APT29|FIN8
-T1566.001,Spearphishing Attachment,Initial Access,Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|Turla|Gorgon Group|Rancor|DarkHydrus|Cobalt Group|FIN7|OilRig|Lazarus Group|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|FIN8|MuddyWater|APT28|TA459|Leviathan|Patchwork|PLATINUM|Elderwood|APT29|APT37|menuPass
-T1566,Phishing,Initial Access,no
+T1566.003,Spearphishing via Service,Initial Access,Lazarus Group|Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal
+T1566.002,Spearphishing Link,Initial Access,Wizard Spider|APT1|Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|OilRig|Turla|APT28|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|APT33|Elderwood|APT29|Leviathan|Patchwork|Magic Hound|FIN8
+T1566.001,Spearphishing Attachment,Initial Access,APT1|FIN6|APT30|Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|Turla|Cobalt Group|FIN7|OilRig|Gorgon Group|Rancor|DarkHydrus|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|MuddyWater|TA459|APT28|PLATINUM|Patchwork|Elderwood|APT29|Leviathan|APT37|menuPass
+T1566,Phishing,Initial Access,GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly
 T1565.003,Runtime Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38
 T1565.002,Transmitted Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38
 T1565.001,Stored Data Manipulation,Impact,FIN4|APT38
@@ -104,18 +201,18 @@ T1564,Hide Artifacts,Defense Evasion,no
 T1563.002,RDP Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
 T1563.001,SSH Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
 T1563,Remote Service Session Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
-T1518.001,Security Software Discovery,Discovery,Turla|Rocke|Frankenstein|The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon
+T1518.001,Security Software Discovery,Discovery,Wizard Spider|Turla|Rocke|Frankenstein|The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon
 T1069.003,Cloud Groups,Discovery,no
 T1069.002,Domain Groups,Discovery,Turla|Wizard Spider|Inception|OilRig|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang
 T1087.004,Cloud Account,Discovery,no
 T1087.003,Email Account,Discovery,Sandworm Team|TA505
-T1087.002,Domain Account,Discovery,Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang
+T1087.002,Domain Account,Discovery,Wizard Spider|Chimera|Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang
 T1087.001,Local Account,Discovery,Turla|Poseidon Group|OilRig|Ke3chang|APT32|APT1|Threat Group-3390|APT3|admin@338
 T1553.004,Install Root Certificate,Defense Evasion,no
 T1562.004,Disable or Modify System Firewall,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Dragonfly 2.0|Carbanak
-T1562.003,HISTCONTROL,Defense Evasion,no
+T1562.003,Impair Command History Logging,Defense Evasion,no
 T1562.002,Disable Windows Event Logging,Defense Evasion,Threat Group-3390
-T1562.001,Disable or Modify Tools,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
+T1562.001,Disable or Modify Tools,Defense Evasion,Wizard Spider|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
 T1562,Impair Defenses,Defense Evasion,no
 T1003.004,LSA Secrets,Credential Access,OilRig|MuddyWater|menuPass|Leafminer|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|APT33|Threat Group-3390
 T1003.005,Cached Domain Credentials,Credential Access,OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33
@@ -124,8 +221,8 @@ T1561.001,Disk Content Wipe,Impact,Lazarus Group
 T1561,Disk Wipe,Impact,no
 T1560.003,Archive via Custom Method,Collection,Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|CopyKittens|FIN6
 T1560.002,Archive via Library,Collection,Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
-T1560.001,Archive via Utility,Collection,APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|APT3|Sowbug|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang
-T1560,Archive Collected Data,Collection,menuPass|APT32|Honeybee|Patchwork|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
+T1560.001,Archive via Utility,Collection,Chimera|APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|APT3|Sowbug|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang
+T1560,Archive Collected Data,Collection,menuPass|APT32|Patchwork|Honeybee|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
 T1499.004,Application or System Exploitation,Impact,no
 T1499.003,Application Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no
 T1499.002,Service Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no
@@ -142,60 +239,60 @@ T1134.002,Create Process with Token,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Turla|L
 T1134.001,Token Impersonation/Theft,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT28
 T1213.002,Sharepoint,Collection,Ke3chang|APT28
 T1213.001,Confluence,Collection,no
-T1555.003,Credentials from Web Browsers,Credential Access,Magic Hound|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats
+T1555.003,Credentials from Web Browsers,Credential Access,FIN6|Magic Hound|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats
 T1555.002,Securityd Memory,Credential Access,no
 T1555.001,Keychain,Credential Access,no
-T1559.002,Dynamic Data Exchange,Execution,Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|APT37|APT28|FIN7
+T1559.002,Dynamic Data Exchange,Execution,Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|APT37|FIN7|APT28
 T1559.001,Component Object Model,Execution,Gamaredon Group|MuddyWater
 T1559,Inter-Process Communication,Execution,no
 T1558.002,Silver Ticket,Credential Access,no
 T1558.001,Golden Ticket,Credential Access,Ke3chang
 T1558,Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets,Credential Access,no
-T1557.001,LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay,Credential Access|Collection,no
+T1557.001,LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay,Credential Access|Collection,Wizard Spider
 T1557,Man-in-the-Middle,Credential Access|Collection,no
 T1556.002,Password Filter DLL,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,Strider
-T1556.001,Domain Controller Authentication,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no
+T1556.001,Domain Controller Authentication,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,Chimera
 T1556,Modify Authentication Process,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no
 T1056.004,Credential API Hooking,Collection|Credential Access,PLATINUM
 T1056.003,Web Portal Capture,Collection|Credential Access,no
 T1056.002,GUI Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,FIN4
-T1056.001,Keylogging,Collection|Credential Access,APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|Stolen Pencil|FIN4|APT38|Ke3chang|OilRig|PLATINUM|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28
-T1555,Credentials from Password Stores,Credential Access,APT39|OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33|Turla|Stealth Falcon
+T1056.001,Keylogging,Collection|Credential Access,APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|Stolen Pencil|FIN4|APT38|Ke3chang|OilRig|PLATINUM|Magic Hound|Sowbug|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28
+T1555,Credentials from Password Stores,Credential Access,FIN6|APT39|OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33|Turla|Stealth Falcon
 T1552.005,Cloud Instance Metadata API,Credential Access,no
 T1003.008,/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow,Credential Access,no
 T1003.007,Proc Filesystem,Credential Access,no
 T1003.006,DCSync,Credential Access,no
-T1558.003,Kerberoasting,Credential Access,no
+T1558.003,Kerberoasting,Credential Access,Wizard Spider
 T1552.006,Group Policy Preferences,Credential Access,APT33
-T1003.003,NTDS,Credential Access,FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0
-T1003.002,Security Account Manager,Credential Access,Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass
-T1003.001,LSASS Memory,Credential Access,Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Stolen Pencil|APT32|Lazarus Group|Leafminer|Magic Hound|MuddyWater|PLATINUM|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver
+T1003.003,NTDS,Credential Access,Wizard Spider|Chimera|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0
+T1003.002,Security Account Manager,Credential Access,Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass
+T1003.001,LSASS Memory,Credential Access,Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Stolen Pencil|APT32|Lazarus Group|Magic Hound|Leafminer|MuddyWater|FIN8|PLATINUM|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver
 T1110.004,Credential Stuffing,Credential Access,no
-T1110.003,Password Spraying,Credential Access,APT33|Leafminer|Lazarus Group
-T1110.002,Password Cracking,Credential Access,APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
-T1110.001,Password Guessing,Credential Access,no
-T1021.006,Windows Remote Management,Lateral Movement,Threat Group-3390
+T1110.003,Password Spraying,Credential Access,APT28|APT33|Leafminer|Lazarus Group
+T1110.002,Password Cracking,Credential Access,FIN6|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
+T1110.001,Password Guessing,Credential Access,APT28
+T1021.006,Windows Remote Management,Lateral Movement,Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390
 T1021.005,VNC,Lateral Movement,GCMAN
 T1021.004,SSH,Lateral Movement,Rocke|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|OilRig|menuPass|GCMAN
 T1021.003,Distributed Component Object Model,Lateral Movement,no
-T1021.002,SMB/Windows Admin Shares,Lateral Movement,Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
-T1021.001,Remote Desktop Protocol,Lateral Movement,Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Stolen Pencil|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|menuPass|FIN10|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom
+T1021.002,SMB/Windows Admin Shares,Lateral Movement,Wizard Spider|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
+T1021.001,Remote Desktop Protocol,Lateral Movement,Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Stolen Pencil|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|menuPass|FIN10|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom
 T1554,Compromise Client Software Binary,Persistence,no
 T1036.006,Space after Filename,Defense Evasion,no
-T1036.005,Match Legitimate Name or Location,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1
-T1036.004,Masquerade Task or Service,Defense Evasion,Wizard Spider|APT-C-36|Carbanak|APT32|FIN6|FIN7
+T1036.005,Match Legitimate Name or Location,Defense Evasion,Chimera|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1
+T1036.004,Masquerade Task or Service,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|PROMETHIUM|Wizard Spider|APT-C-36|Carbanak|APT32|FIN6|FIN7
 T1036.003,Rename System Utilities,Defense Evasion,menuPass|APT32|Soft Cell|PLATINUM
 T1036.002,Right-to-Left Override,Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|BlackTech|Ke3chang|Scarlet Mimic
-T1036.001,Invalid Code Signature,Defense Evasion,Windshift
+T1036.001,Invalid Code Signature,Defense Evasion,Windshift|APT37
 T1553.003,SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking,Defense Evasion,no
-T1553.002,Code Signing,Defense Evasion,Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|APT37|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel
+T1553.002,Code Signing,Defense Evasion,Wizard Spider|PROMETHIUM|Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel
 T1553.001,Gatekeeper Bypass,Defense Evasion,no
 T1553,Subvert Trust Controls,Defense Evasion,no
 T1027.003,Steganography,Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT37
-T1027.002,Software Packing,Defense Evasion,TA505|Rocke|Soft Cell|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon
-T1027.001,Binary Padding,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|APT32|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee
+T1027.002,Software Packing,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|TA505|Rocke|Soft Cell|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon
+T1027.001,Binary Padding,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|APT32|Patchwork|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee
 T1222.002,Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,Rocke|APT32
-T1222.001,Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,no
+T1222.001,Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,Wizard Spider
 T1552.004,Private Keys,Credential Access,Rocke
 T1552.003,Bash History,Credential Access,no
 T1552.002,Credentials in Registry,Credential Access,APT32
@@ -204,7 +301,7 @@ T1552,Unsecured Credentials,Credential Access,no
 T1216.001,PubPrn,Defense Evasion,APT32
 T1070.006,Timestomp,Defense Evasion,Rocke|TEMP.Veles|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT28
 T1070.005,Network Share Connection Removal,Defense Evasion,Threat Group-3390
-T1070.004,File Deletion,Defense Evasion,Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass|FIN8|OilRig|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|APT28|Threat Group-3390|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29
+T1070.004,File Deletion,Defense Evasion,FIN6|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|menuPass|Patchwork|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|Magic Hound|FIN5|APT3|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|APT28|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29
 T1070.003,Clear Command History,Defense Evasion,APT41
 T1550.004,Web Session Cookie,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,no
 T1550.001,Application Access Token,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT28
@@ -213,22 +310,22 @@ T1550.002,Pass the Hash,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,Soft Cell|APT32|Night D
 T1550,Use Alternate Authentication Material,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,no
 T1548.004,Elevated Execution with Prompt,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
 T1548.003,Sudo and Sudo Caching,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
-T1548.002,Bypass User Access Control,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,APT37|MuddyWater|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29
+T1548.002,Bypass User Account Control,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,APT37|MuddyWater|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29
 T1548.001,Setuid and Setgid,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
 T1548,Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
 T1136.003,Cloud Account,Persistence,no
 T1070.002,Clear Linux or Mac System Logs,Defense Evasion,Rocke
-T1070.001,Clear Windows Event Logs,Defense Evasion,APT41|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|FIN8|FIN5|APT28
+T1070.001,Clear Windows Event Logs,Defense Evasion,APT41|APT38|APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|FIN5|APT28
 T1136.002,Domain Account,Persistence,Soft Cell
-T1136.001,Local Account,Persistence,APT39|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|APT3
+T1136.001,Local Account,Persistence,APT39|APT41|Leafminer|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
 T1547.011,Plist Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1547.010,Port Monitors,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1547.009,Shortcut Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,APT39|Darkhotel|APT29|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|Lazarus Group
 T1547.008,LSASS Driver,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1547.007,Re-opened Applications,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1547.006,Kernel Modules and Extensions,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1547.005,Security Support Provider,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1547.004,Winlogon Helper DLL,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Tropic Trooper|Turla
+T1547.005,Security Support Provider,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Lazarus Group
+T1547.004,Winlogon Helper DLL,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Wizard Spider|Tropic Trooper|Turla
 T1547.003,Time Providers,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1546.014,Emond,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
 T1546.013,PowerShell Profile,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Turla
@@ -247,22 +344,22 @@ T1546.004,.bash_profile and .bashrc,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
 T1546.003,Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT33|Blue Mockingbird|Turla|Leviathan|APT29
 T1546.002,Screensaver,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
 T1546.001,Change Default File Association,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Kimsuky
-T1547.001,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Machete|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Turla|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Gorgon Group|Ke3chang|APT19|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel
+T1547.001,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Wizard Spider|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Machete|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Turla|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Gorgon Group|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|APT19|Ke3chang|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel
 T1218.002,Control Panel,Defense Evasion,no
 T1218.010,Regsvr32,Defense Evasion,Blue Mockingbird|Inception|WIRTE|Cobalt Group|APT19|Leviathan|APT32|Deep Panda
 T1218.009,Regsvcs/Regasm,Defense Evasion,no
-T1218.005,Mshta,Defense Evasion,Inception|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7
-T1218.004,InstallUtil,Defense Evasion,no
+T1218.005,Mshta,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|Inception|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7
+T1218.004,InstallUtil,Defense Evasion,menuPass
 T1218.001,Compiled HTML File,Defense Evasion,APT41|Silence|Lazarus Group|Dark Caracal|OilRig
 T1218.003,CMSTP,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group|MuddyWater
-T1218.011,Rundll32,Defense Evasion,APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28
+T1218.011,Rundll32,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28
 T1547,Boot or Logon Autostart Execution,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1546,Event Triggered Execution,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
 T1098.003,Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role,Persistence,no
 T1098.002,Exchange Email Delegate Permissions,Persistence,Magic Hound
-T1098.001,Additional Azure Service Principal Credentials,Persistence,no
+T1098.001,Additional Cloud Credentials,Persistence,no
 T1543.004,Launch Daemon,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1543.003,Windows Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Blue Mockingbird|DarkVishnya|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|Honeybee|FIN7|Threat Group-3390|APT19|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak
+T1543.003,Windows Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,PROMETHIUM|Blue Mockingbird|DarkVishnya|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|FIN7|APT19|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak
 T1543.002,Systemd Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke
 T1543.001,Launch Agent,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1037.005,Startup Items,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
@@ -277,7 +374,7 @@ T1055.005,Thread Local Storage,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1055.004,Asynchronous Procedure Call,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1055.003,Thread Execution Hijacking,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1055.002,Portable Executable Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Rocke|Gorgon Group
-T1055.001,Dynamic-link Library Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,TA505|Turla|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
+T1055.001,Dynamic-link Library Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Wizard Spider|TA505|Turla|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
 T1037.003,Network Logon Script,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1543,Create or Modify System Process,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1037.002,Logon Script (Mac),Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
@@ -285,13 +382,13 @@ T1037.001,Logon Script (Windows),Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Cobalt Group|A
 T1542.003,Bootkit,Persistence|Defense Evasion,APT41|Lazarus Group|APT28
 T1542.002,Component Firmware,Persistence|Defense Evasion,Equation
 T1542.001,System Firmware,Persistence|Defense Evasion,no
-T1505.003,Web Shell,Persistence,Tropic Trooper|Soft Cell|Threat Group-3390|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|OilRig|Deep Panda
+T1505.003,Web Shell,Persistence,Tropic Trooper|Soft Cell|Threat Group-3390|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|APT32|Deep Panda
 T1505.002,Transport Agent,Persistence,no
 T1505.001,SQL Stored Procedures,Persistence,no
 T1053.003,Cron,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke
 T1053.004,Launchd,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1053.001,At (Linux),Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1053.005,Scheduled Task,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Patchwork|OilRig|Rancor|Cobalt Group|FIN8|menuPass|FIN10|APT32|FIN7|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29
+T1053.005,Scheduled Task,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|OilRig|Rancor|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|Patchwork|FIN8|FIN10|menuPass|APT32|FIN7|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29
 T1053.002,At (Windows),Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,BRONZE BUTLER|Threat Group-3390|APT18
 T1542,Pre-OS Boot,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
 T1137.001,Office Template Macros,Persistence,MuddyWater
@@ -316,12 +413,12 @@ T1526,Cloud Service Discovery,Discovery,no
 T1505,Server Software Component,Persistence,no
 T1499,Endpoint Denial of Service,Impact,no
 T1497,Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion,Defense Evasion|Discovery,no
-T1498,Network Denial of Service,Impact,no
+T1498,Network Denial of Service,Impact,APT28
 T1496,Resource Hijacking,Impact,Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT41|Lazarus Group
 T1495,Firmware Corruption,Impact,no
 T1491,Defacement,Impact,no
 T1490,Inhibit System Recovery,Impact,no
-T1489,Service Stop,Impact,Lazarus Group
+T1489,Service Stop,Impact,Wizard Spider|Lazarus Group
 T1486,Data Encrypted for Impact,Impact,APT41|TA505|APT38
 T1485,Data Destruction,Impact,Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38
 T1484,Group Policy Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
@@ -330,38 +427,38 @@ T1480,Execution Guardrails,Defense Evasion,no
 T1222,File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,no
 T1221,Template Injection,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Dragonfly 2.0|DarkHydrus
 T1220,XSL Script Processing,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group
-T1197,BITS Jobs,Defense Evasion|Persistence,Patchwork|APT41|Leviathan
-T1217,Browser Bookmark Discovery,Discovery,no
-T1213,Data from Information Repositories,Collection,Turla
-T1189,Drive-by Compromise,Initial Access,Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|Leafminer|Dark Caracal|APT19|APT32|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|Elderwood|APT37|Patchwork|PLATINUM
-T1203,Exploitation for Client Execution,Execution,Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|APT37|Patchwork|Leviathan|Elderwood|TA459|APT29
+T1189,Drive-by Compromise,Initial Access,Dragonfly|PROMETHIUM|Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|Leafminer|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT19|Dark Caracal|Threat Group-3390|Elderwood|APT37|Patchwork|PLATINUM
 T1212,Exploitation for Credential Access,Credential Access,no
-T1211,Exploitation for Defense Evasion,Defense Evasion,APT28
-T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,Initial Access,Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Axiom
-T1210,Exploitation of Remote Services,Lateral Movement,Threat Group-3390|APT28
-T1202,Indirect Command Execution,Defense Evasion,no
+T1217,Browser Bookmark Discovery,Discovery,no
+T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,Initial Access,APT28|APT29|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Axiom
+T1210,Exploitation of Remote Services,Lateral Movement,Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|APT28
+T1203,Exploitation for Client Execution,Execution,Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Cobalt Group|BRONZE BUTLER|APT37|Patchwork|Leviathan|APT29|Elderwood|TA459
 T1200,Hardware Additions,Initial Access,DarkVishnya
-T1201,Password Policy Discovery,Discovery,Turla|OilRig
-T1219,Remote Access Software,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|RTM|Kimsuky|Night Dragon|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Carbanak
+T1202,Indirect Command Execution,Defense Evasion,no
 T1207,Rogue Domain Controller,Defense Evasion,no
-T1199,Trusted Relationship,Initial Access,APT28|menuPass
+T1197,BITS Jobs,Defense Evasion|Persistence,Patchwork|APT41|Leviathan
+T1211,Exploitation for Defense Evasion,Defense Evasion,APT28
+T1219,Remote Access Software,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|RTM|Kimsuky|Night Dragon|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Carbanak
 T1218,Signed Binary Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
-T1204,User Execution,Execution,no
+T1213,Data from Information Repositories,Collection,FIN6|Turla
 T1216,Signed Script Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
+T1201,Password Policy Discovery,Discovery,Turla|OilRig
+T1204,User Execution,Execution,no
 T1195,Supply Chain Compromise,Initial Access,Elderwood
 T1205,Traffic Signaling,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,no
+T1199,Trusted Relationship,Initial Access,GOLD SOUTHFIELD|APT28|menuPass
 T1176,Browser Extensions,Persistence,Kimsuky|Stolen Pencil
 T1175,Component Object Model and Distributed COM,Lateral Movement|Execution,no
 T1187,Forced Authentication,Credential Access,DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0
 T1185,Man in the Browser,Collection,no
-T1134,Access Token Manipulation,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Blue Mockingbird
+T1140,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|menuPass|Honeybee|Gorgon Group|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT28|MuddyWater|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER
+T1134,Access Token Manipulation,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,FIN6|Blue Mockingbird
 T1136,Create Account,Persistence,no
-T1140,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|menuPass|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|APT19|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER
 T1149,LC_MAIN Hijacking,Defense Evasion,no
-T1135,Network Share Discovery,Discovery,APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug
 T1137,Office Application Startup,Persistence,Gamaredon Group|APT32
 T1153,Source,Execution,no
-T1133,External Remote Services,Persistence|Initial Access,Sandworm Team|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18
+T1135,Network Share Discovery,Discovery,Wizard Spider|APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug
+T1133,External Remote Services,Persistence|Initial Access,Wizard Spider|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Chimera|Sandworm Team|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|OilRig|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18
 T1132,Data Encoding,Command And Control,no
 T1129,Shared Modules,Execution,no
 T1127,Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
@@ -369,28 +466,28 @@ T1125,Video Capture,Collection,Silence|FIN7
 T1124,System Time Discovery,Discovery,The White Company|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Turla
 T1123,Audio Capture,Collection,APT37
 T1120,Peripheral Device Discovery,Discovery,Turla|APT37|Gamaredon Group|Equation|APT28
-T1119,Automated Collection,Collection,Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|APT28|Patchwork|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|FIN6
+T1119,Automated Collection,Collection,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|APT28|Patchwork|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|FIN6
 T1115,Clipboard Data,Collection,APT39|APT38
 T1114,Email Collection,Collection,no
 T1113,Screen Capture,Collection,Gamaredon Group|APT39|Silence|MuddyWater|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Dark Caracal|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|Group5|APT28
-T1112,Modify Registry,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Patchwork|Gorgon Group|FIN8
+T1112,Modify Registry,Defense Evasion,Lazarus Group|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Gorgon Group|FIN8
 T1111,Two-Factor Authentication Interception,Credential Access,no
 T1110,Brute Force,Credential Access,DarkVishnya|APT39|OilRig|FIN5|Turla
 T1108,Redundant Access,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
-T1106,Native API,Execution,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|Gorgon Group|APT37
-T1105,Ingress Tool Transfer,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Cobalt Group|Turla|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|APT37|FIN8|PLATINUM|Leviathan|Elderwood|Magic Hound|APT3|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN7|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
+T1106,Native API,Execution,Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|Gorgon Group|APT37
+T1105,Ingress Tool Transfer,Command And Control,Chimera|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Cobalt Group|Turla|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|APT37|FIN8|Leviathan|Elderwood|PLATINUM|APT3|Magic Hound|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN7|menuPass|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
 T1104,Multi-Stage Channels,Command And Control,APT41|MuddyWater|APT3
-T1102,Web Service,Command And Control,Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6
-T1098,Account Manipulation,Persistence,APT3|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group
-T1095,Non-Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,APT29|PLATINUM|APT3
+T1102,Web Service,Command And Control,Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6
+T1098,Account Manipulation,Persistence,Dragonfly 2.0|APT3|Lazarus Group
+T1095,Non-Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,FIN6|APT29|PLATINUM|APT3
 T1092,Communication Through Removable Media,Command And Control,APT28
 T1091,Replication Through Removable Media,Lateral Movement|Initial Access,Tropic Trooper|Darkhotel|APT28
-T1090,Proxy,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|APT41|Turla
+T1090,Proxy,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|APT41|Turla
 T1087,Account Discovery,Discovery,no
-T1083,File and Directory Discovery,Discovery,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
-T1082,System Information Discovery,Discovery,Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|Honeybee|APT19|APT37|APT32|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT3|Sowbug|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
-T1080,Taint Shared Content,Lateral Movement,BRONZE BUTLER|Darkhotel
-T1078,Valid Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|Leviathan|APT33|OilRig|FIN5|menuPass|APT28|FIN10|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak
+T1083,File and Directory Discovery,Discovery,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dragonfly 2.0|Dark Caracal|APT3|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
+T1082,System Information Discovery,Discovery,Wizard Spider|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT19|APT32|Honeybee|APT37|Sowbug|OilRig|Magic Hound|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
+T1080,Taint Shared Content,Lateral Movement,Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Darkhotel
+T1078,Valid Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Chimera|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|Leviathan|APT33|OilRig|FIN5|APT28|menuPass|FIN10|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak
 T1074,Data Staged,Collection,Wizard Spider
 T1072,Software Deployment Tools,Execution|Lateral Movement,Silence|APT32|Threat Group-1314
 T1071,Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,Rocke|Magic Hound|Dragonfly 2.0
@@ -400,34 +497,34 @@ T1068,Exploitation for Privilege Escalation,Privilege Escalation,Whitefly|APT33|
 T1064,Scripting,Defense Evasion|Execution,no
 T1062,Hypervisor,Persistence,no
 T1061,Graphical User Interface,Execution,no
-T1059,Command and Scripting Interpreter,Execution,APT32|Molerats|Whitefly|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|FIN7|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang
+T1059,Command and Scripting Interpreter,Execution,APT32|Molerats|Whitefly|APT39|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang
 T1057,Process Discovery,Discovery,Rocke|Frankenstein|Inception|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
 T1056,Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,no
-T1055,Process Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Turla|Cobalt Group|APT37|Honeybee|PLATINUM
+T1055,Process Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Cobalt Group|APT37|Honeybee|Turla|PLATINUM
 T1053,Scheduled Task/Job,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
 T1052,Exfiltration Over Physical Medium,Exfiltration,no
 T1051,Shared Webroot,Lateral Movement,no
 T1049,System Network Connections Discovery,Discovery,Tropic Trooper|APT41|APT38|Soft Cell|APT32|APT1|OilRig|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
 T1048,Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol,Exfiltration,no
-T1047,Windows Management Instrumentation,Execution,Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|Soft Cell|APT32|MuddyWater|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|FIN8|Leviathan|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda
-T1046,Network Service Scanning,Discovery,Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|Leafminer|OilRig|Cobalt Group|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390
-T1043,Commonly Used Port,Command And Control,Machete|OilRig|APT28|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|APT29|APT18|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|FIN8|APT37|Magic Hound|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
+T1047,Windows Management Instrumentation,Execution,Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|Soft Cell|APT32|MuddyWater|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|FIN8|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda
+T1046,Network Service Scanning,Discovery,Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|Cobalt Group|Leafminer|OilRig|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390
+T1043,Commonly Used Port,Command And Control,OilRig|APT28|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|APT29|APT18|APT19|FIN7|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT37|Magic Hound|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
 T1041,Exfiltration Over C2 Channel,Exfiltration,Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|APT32|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
 T1040,Network Sniffing,Credential Access|Discovery,Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|APT33|Stolen Pencil|APT28
-T1039,Data from Network Shared Drive,Collection,Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass
+T1039,Data from Network Shared Drive,Collection,Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|menuPass
 T1037,Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke
 T1036,Masquerading,Defense Evasion,Windshift|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|Dragonfly 2.0
 T1034,Path Interception,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
-T1033,System Owner/User Discovery,Discovery,Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT32|APT37|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Magic Hound|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3
+T1033,System Owner/User Discovery,Discovery,Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT32|APT37|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Magic Hound|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3
 T1030,Data Transfer Size Limits,Exfiltration,Threat Group-3390
 T1029,Scheduled Transfer,Exfiltration,no
-T1027,Obfuscated Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Patchwork|Leafminer|APT37|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|menuPass|APT19|BlackOasis|FIN8|Leviathan|Elderwood|MuddyWater|FIN7|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT3|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28
+T1027,Obfuscated Files or Information,Defense Evasion,FIN6|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|Honeybee|Leafminer|APT37|Dark Caracal|Patchwork|Threat Group-3390|APT19|menuPass|Cobalt Group|BlackOasis|Elderwood|FIN8|Leviathan|MuddyWater|FIN7|OilRig|Magic Hound|APT3|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28
 T1026,Multiband Communication,Command And Control,Lazarus Group
 T1025,Data from Removable Media,Collection,Machete|Turla|Gamaredon Group|APT28
 T1021,Remote Services,Lateral Movement,no
-T1020,Automated Exfiltration,Exfiltration,Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee
-T1018,Remote System Discovery,Discovery,Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|Soft Cell|APT39|APT32|Deep Panda|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|Ke3chang|FIN8|APT3|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Turla
-T1016,System Network Configuration Discovery,Discovery,Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|OilRig|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
+T1020,Automated Exfiltration,Exfiltration,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee
+T1018,Remote System Discovery,Discovery,Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|Soft Cell|APT39|APT32|Deep Panda|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|Leafminer|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN5|APT3|menuPass|FIN6|Turla
+T1016,System Network Configuration Discovery,Discovery,Wizard Spider|Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Magic Hound|OilRig|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
 T1014,Rootkit,Defense Evasion,Rocke|APT41|APT28|Winnti Group
 T1012,Query Registry,Discovery,APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Turla
 T1011,Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium,Exfiltration,no
@@ -435,6 +532,6 @@ T1010,Application Window Discovery,Discovery,Lazarus Group
 T1008,Fallback Channels,Command And Control,APT41|OilRig|Lazarus Group
 T1007,System Service Discovery,Discovery,BRONZE BUTLER|APT1|OilRig|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
 T1006,Direct Volume Access,Defense Evasion,no
-T1005,Data from Local System,Collection,Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|Turla|menuPass|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|APT37|APT28|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang
+T1005,Data from Local System,Collection,FIN6|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|Turla|menuPass|Dark Caracal|Honeybee|Dragonfly 2.0|APT37|APT28|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang
 T1003,OS Credential Dumping,Credential Access,APT39|Frankenstein|APT32|APT28|Leviathan|Sowbug|Suckfly|Poseidon Group|Axiom
 T1001,Data Obfuscation,Command And Control,Axiom